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This thesis examines the Kennedy Administration‘s decision to propose comprehensive civil 
rights legislation in June, 1963.  The work focuses on the relationship between the Kennedy 
brothers, particularly on Robert F. Kennedy‘s position as his brother‘s main adviser and his 
influence on the president‘s final decision to go forward with legislation.  It begins by exploring 
the Kennedy‘s childhood, then traces the brothers‘ approach toward civil rights during the 
campaigns of 1952 and 1960, and concludes with an assessment of the Kennedy administration‘s 
civil rights policy during his presidency.  The thesis puts special emphasis on a May, 1963 
meeting between Robert Kennedy and an eclectic bi-racial group of intellectuals led by the 
novelist James Baldwin arguing that the meeting profoundly altered Kennedy‘s understanding of 
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―The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in a time of great moral crisis, maintain 
their neutrality.‖   


















On May 24, 1963 Attorney General Robert Francis Kennedy and his assistant Burke 
Marshall sat down in the Kennedy family‘s New York City apartment with novelist James 
Baldwin and an eclectic group of white and black actors, playwrights, activists, and 
professionals.  Nearly two hours of heated discussion, accusations, and emotional outbursts 
ended when Baldwin and his associates abruptedly walked out, ending a dialogue which on its 
surface appeared to have accomplished little.  Both sides, one representing the highest political 
office in the land, the other representing the new face of activism, had failed to reach an 
agreement on the direction that the movement needed to take.  There was no indication that 
either side fully understood the magnitude of what the other had been struggling to accomplish. 
Baldwin‘s friends openly mocked the attorney general‘s assertion that the federal government 
had been at the forefront of gradual change, while Kennedy scoffed at the group‘s suggestion 
that the White House had no grasp of the reality and scope of the inequality that plagued 
African-Americans on a daily basis.  
The attack dogs and water hoses of Birmingham, the riots at the University of 
Mississippi, and the violence directed towards the Freedom Riders had all passed, yet the federal 
government had failed to produce direct initiatives and legislation that many black activists 
hoped would spawn widespread social change. In the eyes of civil rights proponents, the 
Kennedy administration had merely survived each of these crises, and their failure to follow suit 
with comprehensive civil rights legislation demonstrated the White House‘s lukewarm 
commitment to their cause. To these activists, the 1960 presidential campaign rhetoric 
championing the need for executive moral leadership had lost its luster. The participants in the 
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Baldwin meeting came away feeling the same frustration that national civil rights leaders had felt 
throughout JFK‘s presidency. Following the meeting, Baldwin maintained that a significant gulf 
existed between the reality of the civil rights struggle and the administration‘s understanding of 
that struggle.
1
 What the novelist did not realize at the time, however, was that something had 
moved Robert Kennedy that day in New York. Fueled by resentment and frustration resulting 
from the encounter, RFK set out to create substantive change. Soon after, he began restructuring 
the Justice Department‘s hiring process. More important, he began urging his brother to adopt 
effective civil rights legislation. Indeed, the Baldwin meeting profoundly influenced the path that 
the attorney general would take in order to advance the cause of black equality. 
For decades, historians have debated the Kennedy administration‘s handling of the civil 
rights movement. Scholars have been particularly concerned with explaining why it took the 
president three years to finally accept the necessity for comprehensive civil rights legislation. In 
examining the Kennedys‘ approach to the civil rights movement, historian Bruce Miroff writes, 
―[the movement] did not need guidance from Kennedy; it needed him, rather, to clarify and 
interpret its efforts to those whose prejudice might be tempered or overcome by respect for the 
nation‘s leaders. It needed him, in short, to bear witness to its fundamental righteousness.‖
2
 Yet, 
Kennedy failed to provide that moral support until late in his presidency.  
During the administration‘s first years, the Kennedy administration merely reacted to 
situations created by civil rights activists, relying on executive orders and litigation to dispel civil 
rights crises. In practice, the federal government was not a proactive force for civil rights. From 
the 1961 Freedom Rides to the integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962, the 
                                                 
1
 New York Times, 26 May, 1963, 1. 
2
 Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy (New York: David McKay 
Company, 1976), 225. 
 3 
 
Kennedys consistently allowed the crisis of the moment to dictate their course of action. They 
always advocated a minimalist position for federal intervention, only reluctantly taking action 
when presented with no alternative avenue of mitigation. Yet by June 1963, the Kennedy 
brothers had come to the realization that the civil rights movement was no longer confined to the 
South, as it had found a voice in the poverty stricken northern urban ghettos. These people, 
burdened by the effects of de facto segregation on housing and jobs were more than willing to 
take up the cause for civil rights that their brethren in the South had begun. Circumstances 
demanded an expedient response from the White House. Within months, the Kennedy 
administration dramatically reversed their previous practice of responding to individual 
situations to taking the lead in pressing for comprehensive, national civil rights legislation. 
This thesis examines the transition in Kennedy administration thinking. Furthermore, it 
argues that the meeting with Baldwin was the crucial turning point in that transition. To put this 
argument in context, the first chapter traces the historiography of the Kennedy administration‘s 
role in the civil rights movement. Although scholars have debated numerous reasons for 
Kennedy‘s shift from complacency to action, none have given sufficient or proper attention to 
the seemingly innocuous meeting between Robert Kennedy and the bi-racial group of 
intellectuals.  
The second chapter focuses on the relationship between Robert and John Kennedy. In 
order to have a better understanding of the factors that helped the president conclude that the 
time was right to create comprehensive civil rights legislation, one must understand the 
importance and weight of Robert Kennedy‘s opinion articulated to his brother during moments 
that required critical decisions. It was an influence and bond that had its origins in their 
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childhood, and continued to evolve and solidify throughout their political careers. Its strength 
came from their upbringing, with a foundation based in core family values, social status, religion, 
and above all the expectations placed on them by their father. Chapter Three then explains how 
that relationship was solidified during John‘s senatorial and presidential campaigns of the 1950s.  
Chapter Four analyzes President Kennedy‘s civil rights policy during the first three years 
of the presidency. This chapter places particular emphasis on the Kennedy‘s consistent lack of 
executive initiation in favor of a policy of appeasement. The fifth chapter closely examines the 
spread of the civil rights movement into the urban North, and how it helped to cultivate an 
emerging radical critique of the systemic inequalities that faced blacks throughout the nation. 
This chapter explains the growing importance of figures within the black community such as 
James Baldwin, and what role they would have in re-energizing the movement. The final two 
chapters discuss the Baldwin meeting, the personal impact it had upon on Robert Kennedy‘s 
understanding and outlook towards the movement, and how it influenced JFK‘s decision to speak 
to the nation on the need for civil rights legislation. 
The Robert Kennedy who quietly urged his brother to go on television and make his 
―moral crisis‖ speech on June 11, 1963 had a distinctly different ideological outlook toward 
black civil rights from the attorney general who responded with anger at the relentless will of the 
Freedom Riders two years earlier. This work demonstrates that much of that change can be 
traced to the Baldwin meeting. Their discussion may have seemed ineffective on its face, but it 
actually had a profound effect on Robert Kennedy, both politically and personally. That 
transformation played a significant role in his recommendation that his brother take a legislative 
 5 
 
stand in support of civil rights, a decision that would permanently alter the Kennedy 






















 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE KENNEDY 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement 
 
   In his article ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights 
Movement,‖ Steven Lawson notes that interest in the civil rights movement can be attributed to 
―cycles of nostalgia that prompt Americans to recall the historical era of their youth. Memories 
dredged up turbulent and unsettling times, yet they also harked back to inspirational moments 
when ordinary people exhibited extraordinary courage.‖
3
  
The historiography of the civil rights movement reflects similar cycles of nostalgia. Central to 
those cycles is the tension between focus on particular individuals and specific events, as this 
thesis does, and broader analyses relying on techniques of social history to interpret the 
movement as a whole. 
In the early 1970s Thomas R. Dye‘s Understanding Public Policy applied elite theory—
the idea that dominant minorities, drawn from the upper socioeconomic classes of the country, 
exercise political hegemony over relatively powerless majorities— to the civil rights movement.
4
 
Regarding civil rights policies, Dye postulates: 
The politically active ruling minority is subject to relatively little direct influence from 
the masses who are characterized as apathetic, passive and ill-informed. Elites use their 
positions of influence to manipulate public opinion to advance their own interest. Thus 




                                                 
3
Steven F. Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,‖ The 
American Historical Review 96, 2 (1991), 457. 
4
 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
5
 Ibid., 46-47. 
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Of Dye‘s many conclusions, perhaps the most relevant is his contention that elected white 
officials only responded to black demands for equal opportunity when confronted with intense 
protest campaigns that precipitated a growing political and social crisis that bordered upon 
violence. Thus, by acquiescing to those demands, the political elites were able to preserve their 
political system and their positions of power within it.
6
 
Early histories of the civil rights movement echoed Dye‘s interest in elites, and set out to 
explain how particular individuals or small groups in the black community created the crises that 
pushed white elites into action. In the 1960s and 70s, historians tended to focus on major leaders 
and figureheads of the national movement, such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. As Lawson points 
out, these historians saw the struggle for civil rights as a political movement aimed at achieving 
permanent legislative and judicial change.
7
 Authors such as August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, as 
well as Helen Jacobstein concentrated on men who played various roles in the push for 
legislative change to achieve black equality.
8
  
August Meier and Elliot Rudwick‘s CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement 1942-
1968 examines the creation of Congress Of Racial Equality chapters in local towns and cities 
that did not receive the same amount of national exposure as places like Montgomery. The 
authors demonstrate how CORE‘s national leaders, such as James McCain and Gordon Carey, 
influenced local leaders in their push for equal public accommodations. Lawson contends that 
historical works of the 1970s were written to analyze how national civil rights organizations 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 77. Similar conclusions are reached in Cotman‘s test case of Dye‘s elite theory upon the Birmingham crisis 
of the spring of 1963; John W Cotman, Birmingham, JFK, and the Civil Rights Act of 1963: Implications for Elite 
Theory (New York: P. Lang, 1989). 
7
 Ibid., 456. 
8
 Helen L. Jacobstein, The Segregation Factor in The Florida Democratic Gubernatorial Primary of 1956 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972); August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil 
Rights Movement 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Carl Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the 
Second Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 
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strived to achieve legislative victories, and Meier and Rudwick‘s book fits into that category.
9
 
Although the book suggests that local organizations were critical to CORE‘s successes, it was 
national leaders who drove the push for legislative change. 
 Helen L. Jacobstein‘s The Segregation Factor in the Florida Democratic Gubernatorial 
Primary of 1956 illustrates how the racial climate within Florida was a major factor in 
determining the election of the politically moderate LeRoy Collins as the Democratic candidate 
for governor. The author discusses Collins‘s political strategy during his candidacy to solicit the 
black vote in a state which was still hostile to desegregation of its public institutions. While 
Jacobstein focuses on white politicians, she gives attention to the black community‘s significant 
role in the political process. Written in 1972, this work manifests the growing importance of the 
Black Consciousness Movement in Afro-American historiography. As Robert L. Harris explains, 
such interpretations saw African American history as ―no longer an appendage to the main 
currents of American History. It expressed a distinctiveness that would not be overwhelmed or 
submerged to the American saga.‖
10
 Jacobstein‘s work reflects this idea of black distinctiveness, 
in that she is able to present African-Americans as integral to changing American politics, even 
in a system dominated by whites.  
In the 1980s historians began to shift their focus away from national organizations toward 
local community grass roots efforts.  Drawing upon the methods of social history, historians 
sought to explain how activists in smaller towns organized and fought for equality at the 
community level. These historians suggested that the movement‘s importance lay not only in the 
narrow goal of achieving legislative victory, but rather in the broader effort to create new social 
                                                 
9
 Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 456.  
10
 Robert L. Harris, Jr. ―Coming of Age: The Transformation of Afro-American Historiography,‖ The Journal of 





 William H. Chafe‘s case study of Greensboro, North Carolina 
Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom 
illustrates this approach.
12
 Chafe traces the roots of protest in Greensboro back several 
generations, showing how each subsequent generation had an effect on the following group of 
protesters. 
 David Colburn‘s Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-
1980 takes a similar approach in examining race relations within a city over many decades, 
illustrating how interactions between the black and white communities helped pave the way for 
the demonstrations of the 1960s.
13
 Colburn examines the interaction between the white and black 
communities of St. Augustine throughout the period of segregation. The author observes the 
initial attempts to organize protest demonstrations by local African-American leaders that were 
met with stiff resistance by the white community. Only when national figures, including Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. and Fred Shuttlesworth, came to the city to give Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) support did protests seem to work. However, Colburn shows that 
the momentum that had been gained by the mere presence of these men was almost immediately 
lost when SCLC left the city to continue their work elsewhere. The author discusses how the 
impetus of the floundering protest was placed back on the local activists to ensure its success. 
Colburn‘s focus on the persistent drive by St. Augustine‘s local activists mirrors the transition in 
focus that was being made within academic writings of the 1980s away from national figures and 
organizations. 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 457.  
12
 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom 
(New York: Oxford Press, 1981). 
13
 David R. Colburn, Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-1980 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985). 
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 Steve Lawson notes that community histories such as this are important in that they 
reveal the conflict within and between black and white communities. He also suggests that they 
demonstrate that ―blacks were not simply victims of separate but unequal policies; rather, they 
retained a measure of social, economic, and political autonomy that under proper conditions 
could fuel demands for equality and power.‖
14
 Colburn specifically focuses on the local level of 
activism in order to illustrate not only the black community‘s desire for legislation that would 
end segregation, but more importantly for their desire for social change that would redefine the 
structure of race relations and racial equality within the city of St. Augustine.  
Leedell W. Neyland‘s article, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott in Historical Perspective: 
Changes and Trends,‖ illustrates a similar shift away from national objectives towards a 
communal awareness at the grass roots level. Neyland examines how the leadership roles of local 
ministers and businessmen in the Tallahassee movement played a vital function in establishing 
an awareness of African-American solidarity. The author contends that the boycott‘s success 
should not only be measured in the short term objectives of desegregation of the bus systems, but 
in the ―lasting values found in the acquisition of new attitudes, the development of greater social 
consciousness.‖
15
Other works on the boycott, such as Gregory Padgett‘s ―The Tallahassee Bus 
Boycott,‖ describe how community leaders initiated and drove local protests. The boycott, he 
argues, ―permanently transformed the social, political, and economical institutions of the city.‖
16
 
Works such as Padgett and Neyland‘s demonstrate that civil rights activism in local cities and 
                                                 
14
 Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 466. 
15
 Leedell W. Neyland, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott in Historical Perspective: Changes and Trends,‖ in The Civil 
Rights Movement in Florida and the United States: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Charles U. Smith 
(Tallahassee: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), 56. 
16
 Gregory B. Padgett, ―The Tallahassee Bus Boycott,‖ in Sunbelt Revolution: The Historical Progression of the 
Civil Rights Struggle in the Gulf South, 1866-2000, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 2003), 190. 
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towns did not consist of isolated events distinct to only one individual region.  Instead, they 
illustrate how local actions, even seemingly small-scale one, laid the foundation for the large 
scale national movement that would emerge during the 1960s.  
In the 1990s authors such as James M. Fendrich, Adam Fairclough, and James W. Button 
continued to emphasize the role of local activist groups.
17
 Fendrich and Fairclough‘s works 
examine student involvement in local movements. Button‘s study focuses on protest attempts in 
smaller communities that did not receive national exposure. Fendrich‘s Ideal Citizens: The 
Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement further explored the correlation between the Tallahassee 
bus boycotts and the formation of student organizations and committees. The work is a social 
history that places less emphasis on local leaders than on the ordinary citizens and students who 
contributed to achieving legislative and social change.
 
Similarly, Fairclough‘s article, ―The 
Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, 1955-1959,‖ presents the impact of student sit-ins and demonstrations during the 
late 1950s in communities throughout the South. Fairclough argues that the work of African-
American youths was critical in mobilizing the support of older generations of African-
Americans for organizations such as SCLC.  
Button‘s Blacks and Social Change shows how small communities, such as those located 
on the southeastern coastline, achieved desegregation of both public schools and 
accommodations through local activism without the support of national civil rights organizations. 
                                                 
17
 James M. Fendrich, Ideal Citizens: The legacy of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: State of New York 
Press, 1993); Adam Fairclough, ―The Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1959‖ Journal of Southern History 53, no. 3 (1986); James W. Button, 
Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities (Princeton: Princeton 




Button argues that economic opportunity was a prime factor in mobilizing black protesters in 
these communities. It was during this period of the late 1980s when scholarship began to connect 
racial injustice and discrimination with poverty.
18
 Button claims that these communities were 
unable to mount substantial protests or demonstrations until economic opportunities offered by 
programs at Cape Canaveral brought an influx of African-Americans into the region, bolstering 
support for local movements.  
Even as scholars were working to connect local and national movements, other historians 
sought to trace the civil rights movement‘s ideological foundations. Some looked to the 
movement‘s deep roots, noting the ―legal, theological, and political legacies left by leaders and 
organizations of the 1930s and 1940s.‖
19
 Works written during the latter half of the 1980s 
reexamined the ideological roots of civil rights activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and 
their impact on local activists and the legacy of the movement itself.
20
 David Garrow‘s Bearing 
the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Leadership Conference examines the career 
of Dr. King and his struggle to incorporate his faith and nonviolent ideology to a national 
movement that was constantly evolving. In Bearing the Cross, activist Ella Baker recalls, ―The 
                                                 
18
 Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 463. 
19
 Ibid., 457. 
20
 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Leadership Conference (New York: 
W Morrow, 1986); Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1988); Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-1965 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1998); David Levering Lewis, King: A Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Stephen 
Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Ben Green, 
Before His Time: The Untold Story of Harry T. Moore, America’s First Civil Rights Martyr (New York: New York 
Free Press, 1999); James C. Clark, ―Civil Rights Leader Harry T. Moore and the Ku Klux Klan in Florida,‖ The 
Florida Historical Quarterly 73, no. 2 (1994);  Jake C. Miller, ―Harry T. Moore‘s Campaign for Racial Equality,‖ 
Journal of Black Studies 31, no. 2 (2000); Caroline Emmons, ―Somebody Has Got To Do It: Harry T. Moore and the 
Struggle for Africa-American Voting Rights in Florida,‖ Journal of Negro History 82, no. 2 (1997); Gary R. 
Mormino, ―GI Joe Meets Jim Crow: Racial Violence and Reform in World War II Florida,‖ Florida Historical 
Quarterly 73, no. 1 (1994); Steve F. Lawson, David R. Colburn, and Darryl Paulson. ―Groveland: Florida‘s Little 
Scottsboro,‖ in The African American Heritage of Florida. ed. by David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995). 
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movement made Martin rather than Martin making the movement.‖
21
 Works such as Garrow‘s 
not only trace the ideological foundations of the modern civil rights struggle, but they also serve 
to humanize leaders such as Dr. King as they attempted to continually adapt to the changing 
goals and direction of the movement. 
In recent years, scholars of civil rights history have begun to examine the external 
influences on the struggle by non-governmental institutions. Likewise, they have looked at the 
internal dynamics of local movements, including gender relations, within civil rights 
organizations. Lawson suggests that community studies reveal the ordinary people that embody 
the movement and lay at its foundations. Yet, a major problem evident in historical writings on 
civil rights before the 1990s is that they tended to overlook gender differences in favor of 
grouping both men and women together in racial solidarity.
22
 This approach emerged at a time 
when historians such as Jacqueline Jones began challenging the traditional view of race and 
gender. Jones puts forth the idea that scholars should not study the two as separate dichotomies, 
rather that the focus should be on the point where race and gender intersect.
23
 In recent years, 
literature published by authors such as Raymond Mohl and Glenda Rabby has challenged this 
idea of racial solidarity and explored the intersection of gender and race.
24
 Through their studies 
of the internal dynamics of gender within the movement, the authors have been able to examine 
the roles of female participants at the focal points of local movements.  
                                                 
21
 Garrow, Bearing The Cross, 625. 
22
 Lawson, ―Freedom Then, Freedom Now,‖ 467. 
23
 Jacqueline Jones, ―Race and Gender in Modern America,‖ Reviews in American History 26, no. 1 (1998). 
24
 Raymond Mohl, South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1960 (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 2004); Glenda A. Rabby, The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Tallahassee, Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999). 
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Raymond Mohl‘s South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement, 
1945-1960, not only focuses on the role of Jewish people in the broader civil rights movement, 
but also women‘s involvement in leading South Florida‘s local civil rights organizations. His 
study of black and Jewish coalitions that fought for social equality examines a group of Jewish 
women who faced intense hostility and discrimination both as a result of their gender and 
religion, in addition to their alliance with African-American organizations. In a similar fashion, 
Glenda A. Rabby‘s The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Tallahassee, 
Florida examines the decade of activism following Tallahassee‘s bus boycotts. Rabby differs 
from her predecessors by emphasizing the significant leadership roles played by both student and 
women activists, such as the sisters Loretta and Lurlene Stephens.  
The historiography of the civil rights movement has evolved over the last four decades. 
The initial work of historians of the 1960s that analyzed the role of prominent individuals and 
organizations in their efforts to achieve legislative change underwent a dramatic shift in the 
1980s when the focus centered upon the study of grass root level activism. Recent works in 
academia have enabled historians to continue their examination of community activism with a 
more specialized look at both external and internal dynamics within these movements. The 
historiography of civil rights activism can be defined by distinct shifts and categorized into 
paradigms which have influenced historians since the 1960s, while contributing to a much larger 
body of historical work that helps scholars to better comprehend the events and ideologies 
behind the movement as a whole.  
Yet despite the trend towards community based social history, the examination of 
prominent elites and individuals and their influence on the movement continues to remain at the 
 15 
 
forefront of civil rights studies. An inquiry into presidential politics and the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s requires the engagement of the principles of Dye‘s elite theory as it 
pertains to the political and ideological struggle between prominent civil rights leaders and the 
executive branch. The study of the Kennedy administration and its approach to civil rights gives 
the historian the opportunity to apply these principles in order to better gauge civil rights leaders 
attempts to take an active role in shaping and defining executive policy and eliciting permanent 
















Historiography of the Kennedy Administration 
 
Although there is a robust historiography devoted to John F. Kennedy‘s administration, 
most work related to civil rights gives equal weight to both the president and his brother Robert.  
As the point man for executing the White House‘s civil rights policy, Robert F. Kennedy carried 
the president‘s complete confidence. Indeed, all major civil rights policy decisions were made 
with the consent of both brothers. Thus, the historiography of civil rights in the Kennedy 
administration is largely a historiography of the Kennedy brothers. 
Historians have followed at least three major approaches in writing about the Kennedy 
administration. The initial wave of scholarship, which occurred in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, consisted of memoirs by various aides and acquaintances who knew the Kennedys on a 
personal level. These works tended to offer favorable assessments of Kennedy and his policies, 
often portraying a calm and collected oval office that exuded moralistic fortitude and vision. 
With this type of work dominating the field, the next wave of historians began to produce 
scholarship that provided a counter analysis of the Kennedy presidency. These tended to be 
sharply critical of the president‘s policies and leadership. Several authors argued that instead of 
calm fortitude, a distinct lack of leadership plagued Kennedy‘s administration, especially 
evidenced in critical junctures. These scholars countered claims of moral leadership in civil 
rights, maintaining that the White House in fact acted solely out of a fear that the issue would 
threaten to undercut its own political agenda in such areas as foreign policy. These authors 
argued that the Kennedys exploited civil rights activists in order to win the presidential election, 
and once in power did little to support the movement. The third wave of scholarship attempted to 
find a middle ground between these opposing interpretations. These works conceded that 
 17 
 
Kennedy did not provide strong leadership for civil rights, but argued that he pursued a 
pragmatic, rather than antagonistic, approach to the subject.  
The first efforts to understand Kennedy‘s administration came from the president‘s 
friends and advisers such as Theodore Sorensen, Harris Wofford, and Arthur Schlesinger.
25
 Their 
books portray the Kennedy brothers as champions and staunch defenders of civil rights. These 
authors argue that whereas their predecessors paid minimal attention to the civil rights struggle, 
the Kennedys were constantly evolving and came to embody the moral compass that was 
necessary for effective federal intervention. Unlike later historians, these authors describe the 
Kennedy brothers as aware of the civil rights problem from the outset, asserting that this 
awareness developed further as they attained more political power. Both Schlesinger and 
Sorensen point out that although JFK was not an active defender of civil rights during his time in 
Congress, he did vote in favor of every civil rights bill that came to the floor. Sorensen writes 
that although he did so ―more as a matter of course than of deep concern,‖ the young Senator 
was conscious of the inequality that existed, and that this understanding at such an early point in 
his political career shaped his responses to crises he faced as president.
26
  
These authors also endeavored to demonstrate a personal connection between the 
Kennedy brothers and the movement. They argued that as members of a family of Irish 
immigrants who faced discrimination in the early twentieth century, the Kennedys could 
sympathize with the plight of African-Americans. Sorensen writes that the Kennedy brothers‘ 
speeches, ―invoked comparisons to the discrimination suffered by their Irish grandparents,‖ 
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although, he concedes, ―they did not really experience in their own lives the agony or prejudice 
that Bob would later feel in the lives of others.‖
27
  Another example can be seen in the case of 
the Coretta Scott King phone call. On the eve of the election, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was 
incarcerated for demonstrations in Atlanta and was detained in a federal prison. Hearing of the 
news, Kennedy aides suggested that the presidential candidate make a call as a gesture of good 
will to Dr. King‘s pregnant wife. Schlesinger writes that one of the main factors in his making 
the call was compassion. In their article, ―John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civil Rights,‖ 
Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger suggest that analyses such as those by 
Schlesinger were done to create the perception that ―the call was symbolic of Kennedy‘s 
empathy with the civil rights movement.‖
28
 These Kennedy apologists attempted to show that the 
Kennedys‘ heritage and upbringing provided a moral commitment that was in place from the first 
days of the presidency, and eventually led to the proposed legislation of 1963.  
Early scholarship of the Kennedy administration expressed nearly unquestioning 
approval of the administration‘s civil rights policies. Works by Henry Golden, Carl Brauer, and 
R. E. Gilbert tended to associate Kennedy‘s accomplishments on issues pertaining to foreign and 
domestic policy with those of civil rights.
29
 The most prominent, Brauer‘s John F. Kennedy and 
the Second Reconstruction, focused on the impact that presidential politics had on the civil rights 
movement at a national level. Brauer argues that the Kennedy administration‘s policies and 
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tactical strategy to confront the issue of civil rights played a critical role in the legislative gains 
made by African-Americans. He writes that Kennedy was the first president ―who genuinely 
committed his administration to broad action taken specifically to improve the position of the 
Negro.‖
30
 He also places the president at the forefront of the movement, as a figure whose 
influence inspired realistic social change through executive action and moral rhetoric. Brauer 
describes John Kennedy‘s inaugural address as representative of that leadership.  ―The speech 
moved a generation,‖ he writes, ―Years later it was still being cited by many who were young 
when they heard it, as a turning point in their lives.‖
31
  
Many of the early histories were defenses of the administration‘s record against critics 
who had fervently voiced their objections to the lethargic pace of executive action. For example, 
Schlesinger maintains that it took Kennedy almost three years to propose a comprehensive civil 
rights bill not because the president and his advisers were oblivious to the outrage being 
expressed by a large sector of the populace. Instead, Schlesinger claims, Kennedy acted out of 
brilliant strategic political intuition that allowed for a civil rights plan that would garner 
maximum results. Both JFK and RFK, he argues, recognized that at no time prior to the riots in 
Birmingham was the political landscape prepared for such a bold initiative, and to propose such 
legislation would have been a futile gesture that would accomplish little.
32
  
The following decade saw a distinct analytical shift that presented a direct challenge to 
the traditional views offered by the first generation of Kennedy historians. The authors called 
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into question the myth of the president and his staff‘s interest and willingness to rectify the 
problem of black equality. Works by Nick Bryant, Victor Navasky, Malcolm Smith and Henry 
Fairlie portrayed the administration‘s response to civil rights crises as one of necessity and 
reluctance, in which the federal government was forced into using their influence to maintain 
peace.
33
 This shift coincided with the historiographical shift away from focus on political figures 
toward civil rights organizations and leaders occurring within civil rights scholarship. These 
authors point out that public expressions of concern for the civil rights movement were usually 
empty rhetoric voiced primarily to give the administration maximum political leverage. Bryant 
provides a damaging account of the John Kennedy‘s strategy of appealing to African-American 
audiences in the weeks leading up to the Democratic National Convention while warmly 
accepting segregationist governor John Patterson‘s endorsement. Bryant argues that this sort of 
political maneuvering typified the Kennedy machinery, which attempted to gain the confidence 
and support of both sides in order to ensure its own political success.
34
 Smith echoes this idea in 
his work, John F. Kennedy’s 13 Great Mistakes in the White House, arguing that, ―By exploiting 
a heart-rending problem for his political gain, and by failing then to honor the promise, the 
President betrayed the Negroes.‖
35
 
Fairlie and Navasky take similar critical approaches in their synopsis of the Kennedy 
administration‘s civil rights record. The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation, Fairlie‘s 
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scathing assessment, criticized not only the president and his advisers, but the institution which 
allowed him to hold such a high office. He writes:  
When the display of leadership is so convincing, and the reality of leadership is so slight, 
the people will cease to understand the working of their political institutions. John 
Kennedy proclaimed in measures and in messages that he wished to do so much; but he 
in fact achieved so little. If a leader of such exceptional vigor, commanding an 
administration of such unusual talents, could not achieve his purposes, there must be 
something at fault with the political institutions which balked him…The poetic images of 
dazzling popular leadership on which he relied were so dazzling that his neglect of the 





Although Navasky‘s work was not so vitriolic, it nevertheless sought to expose the emptiness of 
Kennedy‘s campaign rhetoric. Focusing on Robert Kennedy‘s Justice Department, Navasky 
assails the attorney general‘s conservative approach to resolving civil rights crises rather than 
initiating direct action. In Kennedy Justice, the author contends that Robert Kennedy‘s Justice 
Department utilized a strategy in which ―confrontation was to be avoided and mediation rather 
than coercion was the way to achieve social change. They thought they could reason and 
negotiate with men like [segregationists] Ross Barnett and George Wallace.‖
37
 
 Much of the work that emerged in the mid 1980s sought to find a middle ground that 
would neither praise nor vilify the Kennedys‘ civil rights record. According to Jackson and 
Riddlesperger, these revisionists portrayed the administration as: 
Pragmatists who adopted the civil rights movement as a matter of political expedience 
and necessity…[W]hen JFK moved slowly on civil rights, it was because he feared that 
pushing too hard might jeopardize other items on his agenda. When he pursued civil 
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Authors such as Richard Reeves, Bruce Miroff, Taylor Branch, Irving Bernstein, and 
James Hilty applied this idea of a pragmatic approach to their analyses.
39
 Although each author 
varies in his praise and criticism for Kennedy‘s presidency, they all agree that the Kennedys 
primarily comprehended issues in political terms.  Miroff, for example, claims that the 
administration simply approached every problem as a political situation to be rectified by means 
of pragmatic liberal leadership. The racial crisis, therefore, was no different from the communist 
threat; it was an issue to be confronted by merely  ―placing emphasis upon tangible products.‖
40
 
Kennedy, Miroff argues, did his best to eliminate his own personal interpretations, especially 
because he had limited knowledge of the racial problems plaguing the country, by placing the 
bulk of the responsibility on his subordinates, especially his brother, Robert.  
 Authors such as Miroff emphasize that neither JFK nor RFK had patience for moralistic 
crusaders, nor did they have personal emotional investment in issues that would cause them to 
alter their political philosophy. Richard Reeves, echoing this notion writes that Kennedy ―had no 
particular feelings and great voids of knowledge about the day to day lives and cares and 
prejudices of his fellow Americans…Kennedy usually knew what he had to know.‖
41
 The 
revisionists see his presidency as defined by its ability to react, not anticipate. Jackson and 
Riddlesperger write, ―When discrimination encroached on other policy areas, Kennedy wished to 
avoid making civil rights a focal point at the expense of the higher priority…civil rights conflicts 
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were to be avoided rather than confronted by the national government.‖
42
If a civil rights crisis 
developed, then the Kennedys attempted mediation. Failing that, or if a particular crisis escalated 
to the point of violence, then the administration reacted accordingly.  
These historians do not miss Kennedy‘s attempts to exercise executive power as he 
sought to push the movement into conventional political channels. Discussing the president‘s 
handling of civil rights, Miroff observes, ―The issue was out of his control…Parallel to 
Kennedy‘s public stance were his active efforts to gain control over it...he attempted to force that 
struggle back into the traditional channels of American politics…each time in the long run he 
failed.‖
43
Indeed, his and his brother‘s efforts were primarily aimed at maintaining the status quo. 
At no time prior to 1963 did the Kennedys attempt to use the powers of the executive office to 
anticipate and defuse a civil rights crisis before it had the chance to escalate. In his work on 
Robert Kennedy, James Hilty surmises that the Kennedy brothers were benefactors of the social 
changes that were happening around them. He writes:  
In both life and death the Kennedys often got credit for more than they achieved. John 
and Robert lived in changing times and stood at the epicenter of the tumultuous sixties, 
but they were reactors to, rather than initiators of change. Splendid opportunists, they 
carefully gauged events to leverage positions, maximize advantages, and minimize 
weakness. Their principal objective was political power and prestige; their often soaring 




This study draws upon the diverse historiography of the Kennedy administration to 
present a more complete view of the brothers‘ decision-making process. Rather than arguing that 
they were always proactive, simply reactive, or merely pragmatic, this thesis argues that the 
Kennedy‘s exemplified a complex, but very human, development in their thoughts and actions. 
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The decision to push for comprehensive legislation provides convincing proof of that 
development. Before we can arrive at that point, however, we must begin by examining the 
relationship between the Kennedy brothers that developed from an early age to understand how 

















THE EARLY YEARS: THE SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY 
 
 
In order to comprehend the impact of decisions in matters concerning civil rights and the 
relationship between the Kennedy brothers, one must begin by examining the varying paths that 
brought them to the White House. Although both brothers would have some exposure to the 
inequalities that existed between races, it was not until the presidential campaign of 1960 that 
they would begin to realize the depth to which that division extended.  The Kennedys initial 
approach towards civil rights emerged as a result of political necessity, meant to attain victory in 
the election, but never developed further, and as a result was incorporated into the civil rights 
policy of the presidency. Facing a national campaign in 1960, the brothers recognized that unlike 
previous senatorial campaigns, the regional divisions and attitudes towards race relations would 
play a pivotal role in deciding the outcome of the election. The advent of widespread activism 
promoting civil rights for African-Americans forced the Kennedy camp to adopt rhetoric that 
would cater to both traditional segregationists and advocates of social change. This approach of 
appeasement would set the standard for how the administration would attempt to resolve civil 
rights issues in the years following the election. The problem the Kennedys faced in trying to 
formulate and develop a strategy and political platform, was that they themselves had little 
experience in dealing with the inequalities that resulted from segregation. Their youth had not 
prepared them for the scope of the problem, nor did it provide any experience to fall back upon 
during times of crisis. Thus, the pragmatic approach that they adopted reflected the views of 
politicians who did not comprehend the depth of the problem, and who were unwilling to commit 
themselves out of the fear of possible political repercussions.   
 26 
 
Bobby Finds His Place 
 
The Kennedy boys, including older brother Joe Jr., John, and to a lesser extent Robert, 
were groomed for politics from an early age. Their father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was intent on 
utilizing his substantial wealth to gain political influence. Although he personally coveted the 
presidency of the United States for himself, Joseph was stymied throughout the 1940s by 
Democratic Party leaders, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, who hesitated to relinquish much 
power to a man seen as power-hungry, ethically questionable, and who had seemed to 
sympathize with the Nazis in the 1930s during his tenure as Ambassador to the United Kingdom. 
Having failed in his own political endeavors, Joseph steadfastly used his wealth and political 
leverage to ensure that one of his own family members would eventually hold the office of the 
president. Speaking to a group of friends about the futures of his sons, the Kennedy patriarch 
admitted that he had decided that his aims could be best accomplished through his boys, and that 
he had already begun developing plans to have Joe Jr. run for President of the United States, 
John to become a president of a university, and Robert to become a lawyer.
45
 In order to ensure 
these expectations were met, Joseph had his children attend the best private schools and 
universities and set up trust funds worth millions of dollars in each of their names. 
Growing up in the illustrious shadows of his older brothers, whose numerous 
accomplishments between them included published books, war medals, and academic 
achievement, RFK struggled to find a purpose and place within his large family. As the third 
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Kennedy son, Robert consistently fought for the praise and recognition that Joseph lavished on 
his two older brothers. He desired nothing more than to gain the attention and admiration of the 
men of the family, and as a result he spent much of his early life emulating Joe Jr. and John. 
When both of his brothers joined the military and won recognition for their service in World War 
II, Robert begged his father to allow him to put off attending university in order to join the Navy. 
Joseph, however, was adamant that his son would complete his education before entering the 
service. Robert eventually acquiesced to his father‘s wishes and agreed to attend Harvard. While 
there he began writing letters to his dad asking him to discuss political and social issues so that 
he could at least share in a part of the father-son relationship that Joseph had with his two eldest 
sons. In one of those letters he wrote, ―I wish dad that you would write me a letter as you used to 
with Joe and Jack about what you think about the different political events and the war as I‘d like 
to understand what‘s going on better than I do know.‖
46
 He was frustrated by his older brother‘s 
vast knowledge and comprehension of world politics, and he wanted to attain a similar level of 
understanding. His father, impressed by his son‘s willingness to learn, began a correspondence 
with Robert, even offering words of advice and encouragement for the direction of his studies 
and career.  
Through this episode, RFK was already demonstrating two critical traits that would help 
shape his work later in life. First was his unwavering loyalty and incessant need to find praise 
and recognition from his father. He would later demonstrate this same attitude and approach 
toward his brother, John. Reflecting on the strict Kennedy code of loyalty, family friend K. 
Lemoyne Billings would comment, ―[Joseph Sr.] built within the family a real loyalty to each 
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other…Mr. Kennedy always said that the family should stick together.‖
47
 As a result, Robert 
began to mold his own outlook towards both his father and brother in order to comply with this 
standard. Kennedy adviser Ed Guthman writes that as Robert was willing to revise his personal 
identity in order to gain the praise of his father as a youth, so too would he incorporate a similar 
revision to accommodate and adapt to his brother‘s expectations during his presidency.
48
 The 
second trait that RFK showed was his willingness to listen and to educate himself on issues and 
ideas that were unfamiliar to him. 
The tough moralistic attitude that RFK would one day bring to the Justice Department 
developed at an early age. During his first two years of high school his mother, a devout 
Catholic, placed him in Portsmouth Priory, a private Catholic school run by Benedictine monks. 
Robert thrived in this setting, attending morning and evening prayer and mass four times a week. 
This was in sharp contrast to John‘s experience. Although his mother had enrolled John at 
Canterbury, a Catholic school, the young Kennedy detested the school‘s strict discipline and 
pleaded with his father to transfer him to the less stringent Choate Academy, a Protestant 
preparatory school. Robert, however, blossomed both socially and spiritually in Catholic school. 
He began to take an interest in sports and developed a strict personal moral code of conduct from 
which he rarely strayed. He never drank or smoked, was openly dissatisfied with his sibling‘s 
lewd romantic affairs, and refused to listen to or laugh at his peers‘ crude jokes. Journalist Jack 
Newfield would later reflect, ―[Robert‘s] central values were toughness and morality, 
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 From an early age Robert saw the world in moralistic terms, 
showing disdain for those he perceived as excessive and decadent.  
Joe Jr.‘s death in combat forced both Robert and John to reexamine their roles within the 
family. The loss of his first born crushed their father, who withdrew emotionally from the family 
for a time. John was conscious of the fact that his father‘s lofty expectations and plans for Joe Jr. 
were to be placed on his shoulders. RFK, whose parents saw him as their most fragile son, dealt 
with the tragedy by exuding the toughness that had been preached to all of the Kennedy children 
since birth.  He isolated himself and turned to his faith. He went through a period of 
introspection in which he questioned whether or not his father shared the same level of emotional 
attachment to him as he did with Joe Jr. and John.
50
  
During this time of self evaluation, Robert decided that his new role within the family 
was that of mediator and protector. Unlike Joe Jr., John was a free spirit willing to openly 
challenge his father‘s will whenever he felt overburdened by his expectations. Joseph Sr., used to 
directing his sons, resented these challenges. As he would later do during his brother‘s 
campaigns, Robert acted as a buffer between the two, always ready to appease and placate a 
heated situation. A guest of the family in Hyannis Port recounted that shortly after Joe Jr.‘s 
death, John brought some friends from his PT boat to the house for dinner. Joseph had a strict 
house rule that family and guests were allowed only one drink before dinner, but John and his 
friends were repeatedly sneaking alcohol out of the kitchen. RFK was aware that his father was 
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still emotionally distraught over the loss of his son, and desperate to avoid conflict, ran straight 
to John and began openly chastising and berating the entire group for their behavior.
51
   
Arthur Schlesinger suggests that this time period was critical to the transformation of 
Robert‘s character. He writes, ―The code of Kennedys discouraged undue emotion…Robert was 
in effect remaking his personality…in his determination to overcome doubts of his own worth 
and to win the love of the most important person in his life.‖
52
 Robert‘s biographer James Hilty 
writes that his ―personality and behavior were shaped by his abiding sense of moral certainty, by 
his attempt to gain his father‘s approval, and by his struggle to accomplish something as 
significant as his brother‘s colorful achievements. His earnest nature made him feel like an 
outsider.‖
53
 Robert described himself in the harshest of terms, emphasizing that his poor 
academic record and inability to gain his father‘s favor symbolized that he had little status within 
the family. Even his own siblings viewed him as a failure. When asked about her younger 




Robert Kennedy‘s role as protector and mediator fulfilled his desperate search for a place 
within his family. He was willing to invest everything he had to support his family and further its 
goals—a trait that would be essential to his future political career with his brother. Evan Thomas 
writes that this role as protector allowed him to attain a unique position within his family, 
―though at a cost: his independence of spirit would be sublimated, his more sensitive and 
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winning qualities covered over in a hard defensive shell.‖
55
 Furthermore, this new role helped lay 
the foundation for the bond with John that had been lacking throughout their childhood.  
Following his graduation from law school and at the request of his father, Robert became 
the campaign manager for John‘s 1952 senatorial campaign. Joseph, obsessed with fulfilling his 
dream of having one of his sons attain political power in Washington, continuously attempted to 
dictate the campaign‘s direction. His efforts only served to frustrate and strain the relationship 
with his son. RFK‘s arrival as manager diffused the familial tension while allowing both brothers 
to break free from their father‘s will and set their own political course.
56
 Exercising his new 
found assertiveness, Robert took the majority of the responsibility for running the campaign 
away from Joseph, forcing the Kennedy patriarch into an unaccustomed, more subdued, role.
57
  
Robert‘s new position also gave him his first unvarnished exposure to the machinery of 
American politics. The onus fell on him as manager to deal with critics of the candidate, favor-
seekers, and freeloaders who were attempting to boost their own political careers on his brother‘s 
coattails. He ran interference to ensure that John‘s reputation and message were not sullied or 
lost in campaign politics. During a meeting at campaign headquarters, Robert told staffers, ―I 
don‘t want my brother to get mixed up with politicians...I don‘t care if anyone around here likes 
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me, as long as they like Jack.‖
58
 The experience served him well, developing the hard-nosed, no-
nonsense approach that would be invaluable to him later in his career.  
On a personal level, Robert became even more protective of his brother because he saw 
firsthand how sick John was. In 1947 the elder Kennedy brother was diagnosed with Addison‘s 
disease, an illness caused by the failure of the adrenal glands which leads to circulatory collapse 
and weakness. RFK had become aware of the seriousness of his brother‘s illness the previous 
year when their father had sent his sons on a tour of the Far East. While in Okinawa, John was 
rushed to the hospital with a temperature of 106 degrees. A petrified Robert sat at his brother‘s 
bedside and watched as a priest administered the last rites.
59
 Biographer Evan Thomas writes 
that, ―In the 1952 Senate race, Kennedy‘s health was his greatest campaign vulnerability. Had 
voters known how truly sick the handsome war hero was, his political career could have been a 
nonstarter.‖
60
 Both Robert Kennedy and his father understood that John‘s illness could cripple 
the campaign, and resolutely worked to hide the disease‘s physical effects from the public. They 
kept the crutches John needed the majority of the time out of sight from media gatherings, and 
they had him sit under a sun lamp in order to give him a false tan. Joseph ensured that cortisone 
shots, which at the time were seen as an effective treatment for the disease, were on hand at all 
times. 
Devout loyalty overcame major personality differences between the brothers. As personal 
friend and adviser to both Kennedys, Ed Guthman recalled the brothers as being complete 
opposites in terms of their characteristics and mannerisms. He writes, ―John was urbane, 
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objective, controlled, a man of reason; Robert was brusque, subjective, intense, a man of 
emotion.‖
61
 John assessed most situations in a calm collected manner, analyzing issues from 
various political perspectives, whereas Robert tended to react with emotion and impatience. 
These differences allowed the brothers to develop an understanding and trust in all matters, 
personally and politically. Despite contrasting personalities, Robert F. Kennedy would serve as 
John‘s closest adviser and contribute to the majority of crucial decisions that would be made 
during the campaign and later during the presidency. Kennedy adviser Kenneth O‘Donnell 
described RFK as being the essential balance that allowed the president to make critical 
decisions at times when no other voice within the administration was willing to take a definitive 
stand on an issue. He writes, ―The best description of Bobby Kennedy is one that says at 
most…times, especially when his older brother was depending on his firm support, he was wise, 
calm, restrained, full of courage and understanding, and very realistic in getting to the hard facts 
of the situation.‖
62
 John was conscious of the balance that his relationship with his brother 
provided. Shortly after his election to the presidency, he approached Robert and asked him to 
become his attorney general. He said to him, ―I need to know that when problems arise I‘m 
going to have somebody who‘s going to tell me the unvarnished truth, no matter what…I want 
somebody who is going to be strong…and I need you in this government.‖
63
 JFK knew that he 
could turn to his brother when he needed to hear a blunt and realistic assessment of an issue. 
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―John really wanted Bobby by his side, helping him to make the decisions on everything.‖ 
explained author Jeff Shesol, ―Because there was only one person in the world that John 
Kennedy trusted unequivocally, and that was Robert.‖
64
 It was a relationship that would prove 
crucial to the stability of the administration. Commenting on the bond that existed between the 
Kennedy brothers, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would say, ―Don't kid anybody about who 
is the top adviser, Bobby is first in and last out…Bobby is the boy he listens to."
65
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The Kennedys and African-Americans 
 
Growing up in Massachusetts, neither Robert nor John Kennedy were confronted or 
exposed to the inequality that existed between races. Upon reflection, RFK said, ―I don‘t think it 
was a matter that we were extra concerned about growing up…we grew up with the idea that 
there were a lot of people who were less fortunate…separating the Negroes as having a more 
difficult time, that was not a particular issue.‖
66
 The reality of their situation was that relatively 
few numbers of blacks lived in their home state at the time, and even fewer had the opportunity 
to interact with the brothers. 
The Kennedy‘s social status and wealth afforded them few chances to develop any sort of 
lasting friendships or relationships with African-Americans. With the exception of an 
acquaintance with his personal valet, George Taylor, at no point during his schoolboy years at 
Choate and Harvard did John have any significant interaction with blacks. While at a campaign 
stop during the 1960 presidential race, JFK was asked by a black dentist in San Francisco how 
many black people he was friends with. Embarrassed, Kennedy replied, ―Doctor, I don‘t know 
five Negroes of your caliber well enough to call them by their first names, but I promise to do 
better.‖
67
 Ted Sorensen notes that before the election of 1960, ―[Kennedy] simply did not give 
much thought to civil rights…and had no background or association of activity.‖
68
 Until his 
career as a politician began in the late 1940s, the treatment of blacks and the inequalities of the 
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system of segregation lay on the periphery of John F. Kennedy‘s social stratosphere, he was 
simply never exposed nor placed in a position that would allow him to bear witness to racial 
injustice. 
In a similar fashion, Robert‘s childhood was exempt from exposure to black inequality. 
Although he would later claim that several of his best friends during his childhood were African-
American, it was not until his years in university that he would be directly confronted with racial 
discrimination.
69
 One episode in particular took place during his final year at the University of 
Virginia Law School. As head of the Student Legal Forums, it was RFK‘s responsibility to 
schedule guest speakers. He used his father‘s connections to invite illustrious speakers to come 
to Charlottesville, including Joseph McCarthy, Arthur Krock, John F. Kennedy and even Joseph 
himself, who delivered a controversial speech on the failures of the Truman Doctrine. In the 
spring of 1951, Robert invited Dr. Ralph Bunche, the under-secretary to the United Nations and a 
Nobel Prize winner for Peace, to come to the campus and address the law students at UVA. 
Bunche, an African-American, told Robert that he would gladly accept the invitation, however 
he stipulated that under no circumstance would he give his speech to a segregated audience. 
Kennedy petitioned the student council for a resolution that would allow the audience to be 
integrated. The council rejected the resolution, claiming that it would violate a Virginia law 
which banned such meetings. Infuriated by the decision, RFK called the councils decision 
―morally indefensible‖, claiming that the council themselves were ―gutless.‖ Taking the initiative 
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he pleaded his case to the university president, and with his backing along with the dean of the 
law school and several professors, Bunche was granted permission to address an integrated 
audience, the first of its kind in the history of the school.
70
 At this point in his life, the question 
of social equality for Robert Kennedy was simply one that was approached in terms of moralistic 
principles, no different from any other injustice that he witnessed.
71
 There was no great 
examination of black civil rights, nor was there any particular effort on his part to involve 
himself in an exploration of the issues that surrounded racial inequality. Civil rights activist 
Roger Wilkins would later say of the Kennedy brothers, ―They didn‘t know black people. They 
didn‘t know black pain. They were not comfortable with black people…So, there was no reason 






The years between 1950 and 1952 helped to define Robert‘s role as protector for his 
brother, both politically and personally. His active role as campaign manager helped prove his 
worth to his father, his brother and himself. It was a pivotal period that through his loyalty and 
relentless fortitude, helped gain a level of respect and trust from Joseph and John that would 
prove invaluable during the bid for the White House eight years later. The contrasting 
personalities of the brothers played a crucial factor in the political success that would ensue 
following the senatorial victory of 1952. Yet, it was RFK‘s transformation that allowed the 
relationship to find a complimentary balance. Hilty writes that although Robert was seen by most 
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as ruthless, he had in fact evolved the exact kind of personality that could keep John‘s sardonic 
approach in check. He notes that Robert ―could be vexedly absurd yet coldly deliberate, wildly 
irrational yet profoundly logical, extremes that the public nature of his political education only 
magnified.‖
73
 Upon reflection, Joseph Kennedy felt that the political success of the 1952 
campaign was to be attributed to the very different men that his sons had become. He described 
the evolution of Robert‘s personality when he said, ―Bobby feels more strongly for and against 
people than Jack—just as I do…He hates the same way I do…he has the capacity to be 
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THE CAMPAIGN: PROMISES OF A BETTER FUTURE 
 
The presidential election of 1960 was one of the closest in the history of the United 
States, with John F. Kennedy winning the national popular vote over Republican candidate 
Richard M. Nixon by a mere 118,574 votes.
75
 The fiercely contested campaign pitted two very 
different candidates against a backdrop of a racially segregated society on the brink of social and 
cultural change. At the outset of the campaign, both Kennedy and Nixon recognized that the 
election would most likely be decided in critical states, such as Illinois and New York, which had 
the largest amounts of electoral votes.
76
 While Kennedy focused his efforts on gaining the 
suburban and Protestant vote, Nixon was more concerned in winning the farm and Catholic 
vote.
77
 The voting public‘s perception at the time was that the previous presidency of Republican 
Dwight D. Eisenhower had been defined by general inaction in both domestic and foreign 
policy.
78
 Thus, two of the main issues facing the candidates centered on the state of the economy 
and foreign relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of anti-communist sentiment of the 
1950s. However, two other issues that would play a prominent role in the campaigns for both 
candidates, as well as the final election tally, involved the religious affiliation of JFK and the 
struggle for African-American civil rights. 
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The economy under President Eisenhower had seen steady and modest annual growth, 
yet it also had to endure three recessions and a growing division between the upper and lower 
classes. Historian Robert Fried describes this time period as one of ―rampant consumerism‖ that 
resulted in ―pockets of poverty throughout the public sector.‖
79
 Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger 
mirrored this point in a memorandum to JFK, in which he stated the need to address the 
existence of ―public poverty in the midst of private plenty.‖
80
 Soviet relations also played an 
important role in the campaign, with the Kennedy camp charging that the lackluster gains in 
foreign relations by the previous administration had resulted in the existence of a ―missile gap‖ 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 
1957 did little to quail JFK‘s criticism of Eisenhower and his failure in allowing the communist 




From the outset of the campaign, John F. Kennedy‘s religion was the subject of 
widespread debate. Never in the history of the presidency had a Catholic been elected, and many 
critics openly questioned whether a Roman Catholic president would be able to properly separate 
church and state.
82
 Although anti-Catholic sentiment would eventually cost JFK numerous voting 
districts on the day of the election, it would also serve as a tool to garner votes as well, as the 
Kennedy‘s were able to paint those who based their opposition towards the candidate on religion 
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alone as acting out of bigotry and ignorance.
83
 The Catholic issue would remain an important 
topic throughout the course of the campaign, one that Kennedy would repeatedly address in an 
effort to distinguish himself as a candidate who would place the priorities and security of the 
country first and foremost.
84
 
The issue that the Kennedy camp was most uncomfortable and ill prepared to confront, 
however, was that of black civil rights. Prior to 1960, no presidential campaign had addressed 
civil rights as a major issue, therefore the Kennedys had no precedent to follow, and as a result 
they chose to incorporate a strategy that consisted of a policy of appeasement to both proponents 
of black equality and segregationists. Both Robert and John were aware of the impact of the 
African-American community on the outcome of the election, both in actual votes as well as the 
perception of the segregationist South. If they were to appear soft on segregation, they risked 
losing the southern vote, however if they appeared in favor of it they risked alienating an entire 
voting bloc of African-Americans. It was an uneven balance that they sought to maintain 
throughout the primaries and the general election. Yet the promises of the campaign, and the 
events involving the King phone calls in the days leading up to the general election helped to 
create a level of expectation for progress in civil rights that would burden the Kennedy 
presidency, and set a precedent for which the administration was not prepared to champion. 
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Waning Support in the Black Community 
 
The issue of civil rights was unfamiliar territory for Robert Kennedy, and as campaign 
manager it was his job to help create an encompassing platform for his brother to run on that 
would include some sort of statement on the issue. Throughout the 1952 campaign, the subject of 
black inequality had not been a major factor in John Kennedy‘s election to the Senate. However, 
facing the possibility of a national election, the focus on the future of civil rights was becoming 
more prevalent. Preparing for the campaign, Robert admitted that he approached civil rights in a 
similar way to that of his predecessors. He commented: 
Those running for office [in the 1950s] for the Democratic Party looked to just three or 
four people who would deliver the Negro vote.  And you never had to say you were going 
to do anything on civil rights…it was mostly just recognition of them…you could receive 
the vote quite easily.
85
   
 
This process of appeasement and recognition was, in Kennedy‘s estimation, the ideal formula to 
win the black delegates vote for the Democratic nomination, and then the black voting districts in 
the general election. What this strategy in fact demonstrated, however, was his lack of 
understanding on the issue and the growing complexity of the movement. At its outset, the 
campaign began with the idea that it would handle the civil rights issue by running on JFK‘s 
voting record in Congress coupled with favorable, albeit cautious, rhetoric that would appeal to 
black voters.
86
 They hoped that by doings so, they would be able to circumvent any direct 
conflicts from segregationists and civil rights proponents alike. 
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Although the Kennedys had not initially anticipated the black vote to play a major role in 
the election, criticism directed at JFK from major civil rights leaders and activists forced the 
campaign to strengthen their platform. Unimpressed by John‘s senatorial record, black journalist 
Chuck Stone wrote: 
Kennedy has the ability to talk out of both sides of the face simultaneously…There‘s one 
thing money can‘t buy.  That is a liberal and forthright attitude toward Negroes and their 
fight for equality.  Senator Kennedy does not have this attitude. Senator Kennedy has 
been equivocating on civil rights so long, he wouldn‘t know a forthright statement on 
racial equality if it were dragged across his breakfast table.  Search his Senate speeches. 
Has he ever condemned the South‘s barbaric attitude? Has he ever shown deep concern 
about the second-class citizenship? In the present spectrum…Senator Kennedy is 
unquestionably the worst of the lot for the American Negro.
87
       
 
The problem with relying on Kennedy‘s voting record in the Senate to appease potential black 
voters, was that his support towards civil rights had fluctuated based on the circumstances 
surrounding each individual vote. This pattern of voting caused many civil rights activists to 
claim that his support was merely one of convenience. 
Although JFK had voted favorably for minor civil rights legislation during the first five 
years of his term in the Senate, his reputation came into question during the congressional debate 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. These debates cost Kennedy a great deal of black support, as 
activists aggressively criticized his decision to vote with southern senators in favor of a jury trial 
amendment. Civil Rights leaders vehemently opposed the amendment, claiming that it would 
enable southern juries to be packed with racists, thus preventing blacks their entitlement to a fair 
trial. In his explanation of why he voted for the amendment, JFK admitted that he had examined 
the issue solely in legal terms. He had met with Ivy League law professors, who had assured him 
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that the amendment would have no legal ramifications on civil rights.
88
 Dismissing this 
explanation, civil rights and northern activists saw Kennedy as simply playing politics and 
ignoring the moralistic consequences of his vote. The passage of the jury trial amendment 
ensured that southern senators would vote in favor of the Civil Rights Act. Consequently as a 
result of the amendment, the Act as a whole was severely limited in its real world application. 
New York Times columnist James Reston openly questioned Kennedy‘s unabashed attempt to 
gain southern allies, when he wrote that the Senator was aware that the South ―would not take 
kindly to any Presidential candidate who insisted on rejecting the jury trial principle.‖
89
 His 
detractors believed that Kennedy‘s voting record and active interest in playing both sides of the 
civil rights issue was based on his intent to gather support from both Democrats and Republicans 
in order to make a bid for the presidency. Historian Nick Bryant writes that Kennedy emerged 
from the 1957 debate ―looking opportunistic and unprincipled…he underestimated the growing 
militancy of black allies…who viewed any form of compromise as a breach of faith.‖
90
 These 
criticisms would linger throughout the initial stages of JFK‘s presidential campaign, and would 
eventually force him to take a more active role in the debate over black equality. 
A Shift in Strategy 
 
Once the campaign had begun, Robert Kennedy stepped in to his familiar role as 
campaign manager and immediately confronted the critics who had set out to discredit his 
brother. RFK understood that his preliminary campaign strategy would not withstand the barrage 
of attacks on John‘s civil rights voting record. One of the most biting attacks that forced the 
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campaign to take a firmer, more deliberate tone in favor of racial equality resulted from an 
editorial by Jackie Robinson in the New York Post. Robinson, a well respected civil rights 
pioneer and hero in the eyes of the black community, launched a scathing attack on JFK‘s 
presidential qualifications. He openly criticized the Senator‘s guarded token position on the sit-in 
movement, his association with segregationist governor John Patterson, his role in the 1957 civil 
rights debate, as well as his lack of African-American audiences on the campaign trail. Robinson 
concluded the editorial bluntly stating, ―Senator Kennedy is not fit to be President of the United 
States.‖
91
 This damaging diatribe from one of the most influential black leaders of the day was a 
clear signal that the campaign needed to adopt a stronger, more comprehensive civil rights 
platform. 
Following this editorial, JFK began a series of speeches that attempted to demonstrate the 
need for strong executive leadership on civil rights in the White House.
92
 His first speech in 
support of this leadership came the day after Robinson‘s editorial was printed. At a dinner in 
Minneapolis, Kennedy came out in support of meaningful executive action. He told those in 
attendance that the time had come for the Democratic Party to come out definitively in favor of 
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black Americans. He promised that if elected, he would bring about strong moral leadership and 
would ―fight until every black citizen has achieved equal access to all of American life.‖
93
 
Despite this shift in rhetoric, the Kennedy camp still lacked the overwhelming support it 
needed to win the nomination. On the eve of the Democratic Convention, RFK met with Harris 
Wofford and asked the civil rights activist to join the campaign as an adviser on race relations, 
making him the point man for developing the new platform. What worried Robert the most going 
into the convention was the lack of strong support from blacks within the Democratic Party. He 
later said, ―We had to make more of an effort because Negroes were not tied to John F. Kennedy 
as they would be ordinarily to a Democratic leaders.‖
94
 In his memoirs, Wofford recalls Kennedy 
bluntly telling him, ―We‘re in trouble with Negroes. We really don‘t know much about this 
whole thing. We‘ve been dealing outside the field of the main Negro leadership and we have to 
start from scratch.‖
95
 The recruitment of Wofford paid immediate dividends, as he was able to 
draw up a memorandum that spelled out the specific areas in which JFK could make ground 
towards gaining the vote of black Democrats. In this brief, Wofford declared that Kennedy must 
be able to provide direct and active leadership that would be both substantive and symbolic. He 
wrote, ―The president must by his own example—by meeting with Negro and white leaders, by 
the appointment of qualified Negroes to high office, and by more dramatic symbolic actions in 
moments of racial crisis—convey this sense of urgency and conviction.‖
96
 Most importantly 
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though, was a series of meetings that Wofford set up between John and black delegates to the 
Democratic Convention. These meetings allowed Kennedy to better gauge the issues seen as 
most pertinent in the struggle for equal rights, and thus he was able to incorporate those ideas 
into his civil rights plank for the convention.
97
 
Whether or not JFK truly believed the proposals he was putting forth in his campaign 
speech, the fact was that this approach helped rebuild many of the relationships and ties with 
black leaders that had been fractured as a result of the events of 1957. Robert Kennedy was 
willing to admit that at this point in the political process both he and his brother lacked a solid 
understanding of racial inequality. This hindered their ability to create a definitive strategy that 
would help bolster black support for the Kennedy campaign and win the nomination. By 
bringing Wofford into the fold, they were able to subtly exploit and play to the passions of civil 
rights advocates in order to attain political victory.
98
 
John F. Kennedy had raised the stakes of the election through his heightened rhetoric, and 
in doing so had brought the issue of civil rights to the forefront of presidential politics and placed 
himself in the position of being viewed by many political pundits and the populace alike as the 
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new moral compass for the country. Wofford‘s strategy paid off, helping to garner enough votes 
to earn JFK the Democratic presidential nomination. Yet at the same time, that same strategy 
inadvertently elevated the level of expectations for strong executive moral leadership in favor of 
civil rights to heights that no president had dared to attempt. These expectations far surpassed 
any that the Kennedys would be prepared to deal with upon entering office the following year. 
The King Calls 
 
The courtship of the black vote would prove to be one of the defining points in 
determining the election of 1960, as both candidates were forced to tread lightly when dealing 
with a society that was racially segregated. Yet, the entire process of campaigning also 
demonstrated how little the Kennedys comprehended the magnitude of the race issue. To them, 
the black vote simply represented a political bloc that was necessary to achieve victory. During 
the election year, the South was still strongly Democratic, and the brothers had to find a delicate 
balance which would enable John to garner both the black and white vote without offending the 
opposing sides. On one hand, Kennedy was pressured by prominent liberals such as Henry Steele 
Commager, John Kenneth Galbraith, and James M. Burns to make a strong commitment to civil 
rights. On the other side, several southern Democratic governors threatened to back Nixon if 




To ease the demands of civil rights proponents, John offered campaign promises such as 
the elimination of federal housing projects, and continued to increase his civil rights rhetoric 
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following the Democratic Convention.
100
 When discussing the civil rights movement, JFK had 
boldly proclaimed, ―[the next president] must exert the great moral and educational force of his 
office to help bring equal access to public facilities from churches to lunch counters and to 
support the right of every American to stand up for his rights, even if on occasion he must sit 
down for them.‖
101
 However, in an effort to maintain the balance of the segregated South, 
Kennedy also continued to court the vote of white segregationists. In a move that shocked and 
perplexed many civil rights supporters, he selected Texan Lyndon B. Johnson as his vice-
presidential running mate.
102
 Segregationist leaders interpreted this move as an indication that 
the Kennedy presidency would be more apt to incorporate civil rights into the national agenda at 
a slower pace than their campaign rhetoric had suggested. 
As a result of Kennedy‘s attempts to secure support from both sides of the racial 
spectrum, neither presidential candidate had the overwhelming support of the black vote by mid-
October of the election year. In his memoirs, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. commented, ―I did not 
feel at that time that there was much difference between Kennedy and Nixon…I could find 
something in the background of both men that I couldn‘t particularly agree with.‖
103
 After 
months of campaigning, however, the decisive moment that would help to define each candidate 
in the eyes of many voters would take place in the final weeks before the election. The catalyst 
                                                 
100
 John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers. Box 910. Speech to the National Democratic Club Luncheon in New 
York. June 17, 1960 
101
 John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers. Box 909. Speech in Baltimore, Maryland. May 13, 1960; Excerpts 
from the speech can also be found in Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions, 230. 
102
 Burton Hersh, Bobby and J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2007), 14.  Hersh writes that 
it was Joseph Kennedy who brought LBJ onto the ticket against the wishes of RFK and JFK.  He writes, ―[Joseph] 
presented the upset Lyndon ―his own version of the future, whereby ‗these boys‘ are not ready to run the country, 
which means that ‗you and I, Lyndon‘ are going to have to run it for them.‖  He then offered LBJ $1 million to settle 
his campaign debts, which the new vice president nominee accepted. 
103
 Martin Luther King Jr., The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Intellectual Properties 
Management, 1998) , 148. 
 50 
 
that helped one candidate emerge as the victor stemmed from the controversial events 
surrounding the arrest of Dr. King in Atlanta, Georgia. The phone calls made in response to 
King‘s incarceration by both JFK and RFK helped to separate the two candidates in the eyes of 
minority black voters, and thus altered the course of the election. 
On the morning of October 19, 1960 Dr. King reluctantly joined a massive sit in 
demonstration in downtown Atlanta, and was subsequently arrested along with the student 
demonstrators. Wofford, without authority from the Kennedy camp, brokered a deal with the 
presiding judge that would allow the demonstrators to be released on Monday, October 24. King, 
however, was denied his release on the grounds of a violation of the terms of a suspended 
sentence resulting from a minor traffic offense in which he had been cited for driving without a 
Georgia driver‘s license the previous spring. A judge in DeKalb County, Georgia issued a 
warrant for King‘s arrest on the basis that his sit-in arrest had violated the terms of his probation 
from the traffic offense.
104
 King was transferred to a prison in DeKalb, a stronghold of the Ku 
Klux Klan, where he was sentenced by the judge to four months of hard labor. Upon hearing the 
news of Dr. King‘s incarceration, black novelist John A. Williams wrote, ―The death of Martin 
King in the state public work camp was imminent.‖
105
 King‘s wife, Coretta, was five months 
pregnant at the time of the sentencing, and physically broke down in the courthouse upon hearing 
the fate of her husband. She later recalled her emotional state as being one of desperate fear, 
coupled with the recognition that her baby would be born while her husband was in jail.
106
 
Wofford drew up a statement of protest for Kennedy to issue, however Robert rebuffed the idea, 
fearing political fallout at such a critical point in the campaign. 
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Two days after the ruling in DeKalb, Coretta Scott King called Wofford and told him that 
overnight the situation for her husband had taken a turn for the worse. In the middle of the night, 
Dr. King had been awoken, removed from his jail cell, shackled, and driven throughout the night 
to rural Reidsville state prison. Wofford immediately called Kennedy‘s brother-in-law and 
director of the campaign‘s civil rights sector, Sargent Shriver Jr., and explained the situation 
regarding King‘s transfer and his wife‘s concerns.
107
 Author David Niven suggests that by going 
directly to Shriver, Wofford intended to circumvent the voices of opposition within the Kennedy 
camp and ―prevent the campaign from forming a committee to ponder the electoral ramifications 
of the act.‖
108
 Essentially he was trying to avoid having to gain the approval of RFK. Shriver 
tracked Kennedy down in a motel in the Chicago airport and waited until the two of them were 
alone. He then told Kennedy: 
Why don‘t you telephone Mrs. King and give her your sympathy? Negroes don‘t expect 
everything will change tomorrow, no matter who‘s elected. But they do want to know 
whether you care. If you telephone Mrs. King, they will know you understand and will 
help. You will reach their hearts and give support to a pregnant woman who is afraid her 




 The call lasted only two minutes, but its political ramifications would have a lasting effect on 
the image of Kennedy within the black community. 
Once he had Coretta King on the phone, Senator Kennedy greeted her, and said, ―I know 
this must be very hard for you. I understand you are expecting a baby, and I just wanted you to 
know that I was thinking about you and Dr. King. If there is anything I can do to help, please feel 
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free to call me.‖
110
 After he hung up, JFK left the hotel suite he was staying in and boarded his 
campaign plane that was headed for Detroit. While on the plane, he mentioned to his adviser 
Pierre Salinger that he had talked with Mrs. King. Salinger immediately informed the Senator‘s 
campaign manager and brother, Robert Kennedy. 
Robert was outraged and disgusted with Shriver, Wofford, and Martin.  Infuriated, he 
called them into his office and berated them. Wofford recalls Kennedy yelling ―You bomb-
throwers probably lost the election…you‘ve probably lost three states…the civil rights section 
isn‘t going to do another damn thing in this campaign.‖
111
 He lectured the two men on their 
insubordination, as well as for pushing his brother into a potentially explosive controversy with 
only weeks remaining before Election Day. His order for the civil rights section was quite 
explicit; they were to create no literature or press releases on the matter. Yet, when Louis Martin 
described King‘s midnight transfer to Reidsville, RFK answered quizzically, ―How could they do 
that?  Who‘s the judge?  You can‘t deny bail on a misdemeanor.‖ Martin explained to him that 
the judge wanted to make an example out of Dr. King. Frustrated by the possibility of a backlash 
against his brother, he talked to his aide John Seigenthaler and asked him what he could do to 
draw fire away from JFK.
112
 
Already Robert was re-establishing his familiar role as protector. The call itself was not 
what upset RFK, nor did he disagree with the gesture. In his eyes the peculiarities that were 
evident in the handling of the King case were inexcusable. However, his mindset was solely 
focused on the success of his brother, and therefore any problem that jeopardized that success 
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was intolerable. His role as protector usurped any injustice that was affecting a high profile civil 
rights leader. John had the luxury of viewing the issue in purely moralistic terms. To JFK, what 
was happening to Dr. King and his wife was unjust, and therefore should be addressed. Robert, 
on the other hand, had to place the issue in proper perspective, weighing the possible outcomes 
that taking a direct stand could have in the eyes of fellow politicians and the voting public on his 
brother‘s bid for election. 
That night, John was getting off of his campaign plane in New York when a reporter 
from the New York Times asked him if he had indeed called Mrs. King earlier that day. Kennedy 
responded that she was a friend of his, and that he was concerned about the situation. This 
confirmation allowed the Times to break the story of the call to Coretta Scott King.
113
 Picking up 
on the story, the Atlanta Constitution ran a front page article that included Mrs. King‘s 
recollection of the event. In the article, she was quoted as saying, ―It certainly made me feel good 
that he had called me personally and let me know how he felt. I had the feeling that if he was that 
much concerned, he would do what he could to see that Mr. King is let out of jail.‖ Regarding 
Vice President Nixon‘s response to the situation, Mrs. King said, ―He‘s been very quiet.‖
114
 
Following Dr. King‘s arrest, the Kennedy brothers had discussed possible avenues which 
they could pursue in order to have him released. They recognized that inaction could be more 
harmful than action, yet they also understood that they could risk losing southern white support. 
Politically, the incarceration of a prominent black civil rights leader cast the southern Democrats 
in a bad light. Neither Kennedy brother wanted to allow Richard Nixon and the Republicans the 
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opportunity to point that fact out to the voting public. They agreed that the best scenario would 
be to have King set free in the most discreet manner possible. 
JFK contacted Georgia Governor Vandiver and discussed the issue. Vandiver was aware 
of the embarrassment that King‘s imprisonment had caused his state, and he agreed to make 
some phone calls for Kennedy. The governor got in contact with the Secretary of the State 
Senate, George D. Stewart. Stewart and the judge in charge of the King case, Oscar Mitchell, 
were good friends and former classmates. Stewart discussed the matter with Judge Mitchell, who 
in turn agreed to have King released with the stipulation that he could say one of the Kennedy 
brothers had called him and asked him to do it. As a segregationist judge, Mitchell did not want 
to appear weak, and a Kennedy call would be the perfect political cover. Upon hearing of the 
judge‘s request, Vandiver phoned John Kennedy, who consented and ordered his brother to make 
the call to the judge to demand King‘s release.
115
 
The following morning, Louis Martin was awoken by a phone call from Robert. RFK told 
him, ―Louis, I wanted you especially to know that I called that judge in Georgia today, to try to 
get Dr. King out.‖ By making the call to Vandiver, Robert was demonstrating a clear pragmatic 
approach to the crisis. He was wary of the political repercussions that could result from his 
brother‘s actions, and realized that it was necessary to take steps that would ensure minimal 
damage towards the national perception of the Democratic candidate. As Harris Wofford 
reflected on the matter, ―If King had remained in jail, the Senator‘s call to Mrs. King might have 
seemed a symbol without substance- the worst fate for any symbolic act.‖
116
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Martin Luther King Jr. was released from prison on October 27, and although he would 
not openly endorse Kennedy, his father Marin Luther King Sr. publicly rescinded his pledge to 
vote for Richard Nixon.
117
 In a speech to the congregation of Ebenezer Baptist Church, King Sr. 
said, ―It took courage to call my daughter-in-law at a time like this. He has the moral courage to 
stand up for what he knows is right. I‘ve got all my votes and I‘ve got a suitcase, and I‘m going 
to take them up there and dump them in his lap.‖
118
 
The next day the New York Times, Atlanta Constitution, and Chicago Tribune all featured 
front page stories about King‘s release from prison. Each article discussed Judge Mitchell‘s 
statements regarding pressure to release King coming from a member of the Kennedy family; the 
Constitution even quoted Mitchell‘s remarks about that pressure coming from a brother of the 
Senator from Massachusetts.
119
 While attention from the mainstream white media quickly turned 
to other issues following King‘s release, African American newspapers who openly endorsed the 
Kennedy-Johnson ticket saw an opportunity to separate their candidate from Nixon. These 
papers effectively utilized the phone calls to bolster their support of a candidate whom they 
could now portray as being compassionate enough to personally aid a major civil rights figure 
and his family in a time of crisis. 
The coverage which was given by these newspapers for the Kennedy calls helped to 
shape the image of the presidential candidate within black communities as a man who was 
willing to not only take the moral high ground, but also have the character to back up his rhetoric 
with action. In stark contrast, the image of Richard Nixon was that of a man of inaction, a 
candidate who did not hold the plight of black people in high regard. By his own accounts, 
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Nixon had considered making a public statement supporting King during his imprisonment but 
had been advised not to comment. In his personal memoirs, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, ―I 
always felt that Nixon lost a real opportunity to express support of something much larger than 
an individual, because this expressed support for the movement for civil rights.  It indicated the 
direction that this man would take, if he became president.‖
120
 The Kennedy phone calls would 
serve as a catalyst to clearly separate the two candidates on the issue of civil rights. Several years 
after the election, Richard Nixon would recall the events of October, 1960 saying, ―I thought my 
civil rights record was good. I thought I had won many friends among Negroes, but then the Rev. 




Only two days after the Times had broken the story of the call to Coretta King, the pro-
Kennedy black newspapers the Afro-American, Chicago Defender, and Pittsburgh Courier all 
ran inserts discussing the Democratic candidate‘s civil rights record. The insert led off with a 
quote from the executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NCAAP), Roy Wilkins. He said, ―The Senator‘s record, taken as a whole… must be 
regarded…as one of the best voting records on civil rights and related issues of any Senator in 
Congress.‖
122
 This was in sharp contrast to Wilkins heavy criticism of Kennedy following his 
1957 vote for the jury trial amendment. However, the change in rhetoric demonstrates the desire 
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of the black community to unify around a common political figure who on the surface appeared 
to be capable of pushing forward the agenda for the advancement of black rights.
123
 
Following the lead of the Courier, the Afro-American ran a series of articles pertaining to 
the Kennedy calls and the subsequent reaction from civil rights leaders. Based in Maryland, the 
paper‘s national edition had major distribution centers within the battleground states of 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey. On November 5, the paper ran a front page spread 
entitled ―It‘s Kennedy: Afro’s Choice for President.‖ This article openly endorsed the Kennedy-
Johnson ticket, citing Kennedy‘s stellar civil rights voting record in Congress, as well as plans 
for future civil rights legislation. The article stated, ―Kennedy sees the presidency as an 
opportunity to turn into a living reality the American vision of a free society in which no man has 
to suffer discrimination based on race…no presidential candidate has made a more forthright 
statement on Civil Rights.‖
124
 
For many black voters, the Kennedy calls came to represent something more significant 
than the simple actions that they were. In the eyes of the black community, they represented a 
beacon of hope that promised their segregated society an opportunity for equality in the near 
future. The calls themselves, however, had little to do with morality or human suffering. Instead, 
at their core they represented the principles and foundation that lay at the heart of the Kennedy 
campaign strategy. They were politically opportunistic moments that were capitalized and then 
exploited by the Kennedy camp. The evolution of Robert‘s perception of racial inequality had 
yet to broaden to a true understanding of what the civil rights movement really meant. The 
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frustration and incessant desire for equality felt by African-Americans at this point did not exist 
in the world of the Kennedys. RFK approached problems of race in the same moralistic manner 
that he had the incidents at Harvard and UVA Law.
125
 He simply saw an unjust situation and set 
out to rectify it, more conscious of the moral ramifications than the social ones. The only 
difference in this approach, was that during the 1960 campaign he had to be mindful of the 
implications that such action would have on the political aspirations of his brother. Both John 
and Robert felt that the incarceration of King was unjust, but there reaction to that event was 
calculated in a manner that would yield the most positive results for the Democratic nominee. 
Like the Wofford platform at the party convention and the heightened rhetoric in favor of 
black equality, the Kennedy phone calls served to raise the level of African-Americans 
expectations of the incoming administration to lead with a firm and authoritative moral edge that 
had yet to be seen in the White House. In the end, the Kennedy approach to winning the election 
paid off, but concordantly created a new set of problems in the arena of civil rights that would 
not be as easily solved through the inherent pragmatic approach to politics that they had 
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THE PRESIDENCY: A LEGACY OF INACTION 1960-1962 
 
The Freedom Rides 
 
Weeks after the inauguration, the newly appointed Attorney General Robert Kennedy met 
with Dr. King and suggested that it was too soon to ask for any sort of civil rights legislation.
126
 
In his memoirs, Harris Wofford wrote of the president‘s continual inaction in constructing civil 
rights legislation, ―What disappointed me most was not so much the President‘s recurring 
decision to wait…as the way he made the decision- each time hurriedly, at the last minute, 
without careful consideration of an overall strategy.‖
127
 Following the election, however, events 
had already begun to unfold that would immediately test the administrations civil rights policy.  
The first major civil rights crisis that the Kennedy administration encountered came 
during the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Freedom Rides of 1961. Feeling that the 
movement had an ally in the White House, CORE director James Farmer announced that a small 
integrated group would ride buses into the segregated South, and peacefully gain entry to 
segregated bus terminals, thus forcing the issue of desegregation within those terminals. As a 
result of a December 1960 Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation in bus and train 
terminals involved in interstate transportation, Farmer thought that the Freedom Rides could 
create a crisis that would leave the federal government in a position in which they would have to 
take action.
128
 The itinerary for the trip included leaving Washington D.C. on May 4, and 
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Two days after the Freedom Rides began, Robert Kennedy delivered an address at the 
University of Georgia during the celebration of Law Day. Kennedy‘s speech was indicative of 
how his office would confront the civil rights crises when he said: 
We know that the law is the glue that holds civilization together. And, we know that if 
one man‘s rights are denied, the rights of all are endangered. In our country the courts 
have a most important role in safeguarding these rights. The decisions of the courts, 
however much we might disagree with them, in the final analysis must be followed and 
respected…Respect for the Law, in essence that is the meaning of Law Day and every 




His words would be tested a week later, when the Freedom Riders arrived in Anniston, Alabama 
on May 14. Their bus was firebombed by a white mob, while the riders themselves were dragged 
into the street and maliciously beaten. Although the Kennedy brother‘s immediate reaction to the 
violence was one of shock, they were also aware of how that violence would reflect on the new 
presidency.
131
 The attorney general thought that attempts by civil rights leaders such as King and 
Farmer were meant to antagonize and embarrass his brother‘s administration. As a result, RFK 
called Wofford, who now served as JFK‘s special assistant on civil rights, and told him, ―Tell 
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After the attorney general had arranged for a replacement bus for the Freedom Riders, a 
new group of activists continued the journey to Montgomery, Alabama.
133
 There they were met 
with even more brutal white mob violence than had been seen in Anniston. RFK‘s closest aide, 
John Seigenthaler, drove by the scene in order to gather information and report back to 
Washington. He attempted to help a black woman escape the mob, and was subsequently 
knocked unconscious by a white man wielding a metal pipe.
134
 Despite this instance of brutality, 
the president continually disregarded suggestions by his aides to send federal troops to intervene. 
Instead, he chose to adopt a more passive route and had Robert initiate legal proceedings in 
federal court to stop Alabama‘s injunction against the rides. At the same time, he also telephoned 
southern congressmen and governors, ensuring them that the administration would not support 
the Freedom Rides, but would provide them with the protection that the law stipulated.
135
 The 
Kennedy brothers were implementing their typical political strategy of playing both sides of an 
issue in order to appease each party involved. The president thought that the agenda of civil 
rights was being forced upon him, and he was not prepared to publicly deal with it during the 
initial year of his presidency. Although he was frustrated by the developments in Alabama, he 
did issue a public statement on the matter saying: 
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The situation which has developed in Alabama is a source of the deepest concern to me 
as it must be to the vast majority of the citizens of Alabama and other Americans. I have 
instructed the Justice Department to take all necessary steps based on their investigations 
and information…I hope that state and local officials in Alabama will meet their 




Having come out with a definitive statement on the Freedom Rides, JFK and his brother 
privately hoped that further confrontation could be avoided. Against the attorney general‘s 
wishes, however, Martin Luther King went to Montgomery to personally offer his support to the 
Riders. Once there, he led a worship service at the First Baptist Church with a group of the 
Freedom Riders and over 1,500 sympathizers. With only fifty U.S. marshals protecting the 




Once again the president considered the possibility of sending federal troops into 
Alabama. RFK on the other hand, feared that the situation would dissipate into a scene of 
violence, and therefore advised his brother not to send the Army. In an attempt to temper the 
escalating crisis, the president ordered unmarked federal marshals carrying tear gas to move in 
and disperse the mob. Alabama National Guardsmen were called in by Governor John Patterson 
only when the governor had heard that there was a possibility of intervention from federal troops. 
Many of the Alabama Guardsmen were as racist as the white mob that they were trying to 
prevent from entering the church. As a result, King and those trapped inside the church were 
forced to stay there throughout the night. The crisis ended the following morning when the 
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What the Freedom Rides proved to the Kennedys, was that the focus of any civil rights 
movement should not be on public displays of protest or resistance that could lead to unwanted 
confrontations between the federal government and southern state and local officials. The 
Kennedy brothers were just as willing as state officials to avoid having to be forced into using 
the military to enforce civil rights. Instead, the administration made it a point that the focus 
should not be on inflammatory demonstrations. They continued to stress that the proper path to 
black equality must be achieved through gradual means. Discussing the course that the president 
wanted to set, historian Bruce Miroff writes:  
[JFK] wanted to see racial justice attained, he was not so sure he wanted it attained along 
the lines that the civil rights movement was developing…what mattered to him was that 
their actions were unpredictable, perpetually threatening to immerse him in situations for 




To the Kennedys, the only clear way in which they could dictate the pace of the 
movement while avoiding possible confrontations, was by placing an emphasis on black voter 
registration.
140
 On June 16, RFK met with a group of civil rights leaders and made the case to 
them that public demonstrations such as the Freedom Rides were not a productive way to create 
social change. In place of such protests, Kennedy offered the full support of the Justice 
Department to protect and uphold the rights of civil rights activists who wanted to register to 
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 He would later be quoted as saying, ―I felt strongly about the fact that voting was at the 
heart of the problem. If enough Negroes registered, they could obtain redress of their grievance 
internally, without the federal government involved in it at all.‖
142
 Regardless of what the 
Kennedys deemed appropriate civil rights activism, what the events in Montgomery did do was 
to set the precedent for the initial years of the presidency, in which the White House was willing 
to rely on the action of state officials to resolve confrontations within their own states. If 
challenged by those state officials, as in the case of the Freedom Rides and later in the standoffs 
at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama, then they would reluctantly take federal action in 
the most discrete way possible. In their first test of civil rights, the Kennedys had deliberately 
sidestepped the strong moral commitment that had been promised throughout the presidential 
campaign. Neither brother had grasped the severity of the problem of black inequality. 
Reflecting on Robert‘s attitudes towards the Riders and their persistence in their journey, 
journalist Jack Newfield said, ―I think he [RFK] was slow and late getting it, about the Civil 
Rights Movement. Robert Kennedy was saying what most of the establishment said in that 
period, it‘s a good idea but it‘s the wrong time.‖ The Freedom Rides would be the first in a line 
of passive responses from the White House that would serve to continually frustrate and anger 
civil rights activists throughout the tenure of the Kennedy presidency.  
The Integration of Ole Miss 
 
Following the events in Alabama, the president was hesitant in his willingness to make a 
strong public commitment towards civil rights legislation, as he did not want to risk alienating 
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southern Democrats who were running for re-election in Congress in the fall of 1962, and who 
would support his own presidential re-election campaign.
143
 For civil rights leaders, the 
momentum that had been carried from the Freedom Rides was disrupted by events in the city of 
Albany, Georgia. Under the direction of King, a coalition between his SCLC, the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and CORE designed a campaign whose ultimate 
goal was to end segregation in Albany. Their plan was to organize as many large scale sit-ins and 
demonstrations as possible in order to cause such disruptions in the day to day functioning of the 
city that Albany officials would be forced to integrate facilities such as bus and railroad 
stations.
144
 Despite the unrelenting commitment of activists, Albany officials refused to budge, 
and inevitably the movement was abandoned. King was infuriated by the Kennedy 
administrations lack of involvement in the Albany movement.
145
 An emissary of black ministers 
sent by King to discuss the failing effort in Albany arrived at the White House on August 6 and 
was abruptly turned away. With city commissioners threatening to enforce the city‘s 
segregationist laws more forcefully if protests continued, King implored the White House to 
make a resolute statement in support of the activists. Kennedy remained silent on the issue, as the 
                                                 
143
Stewart Burns, To the Mountaintop: Martin Luther King Jr.’s Sacred Mission to Save America: 1955-1968 (San 
Francisco: HarperCollins, 2004), 173. 
144
 David L. Lewis, King: A Biography (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 147; New York Times, 16 
August 1962, 1. 
145
 John F. Kennedy Public Papers of the President 1962. The President‘s News Conference of August 1, 1962. One 
of the only public statements made by JFK in favor of the activists during the Albany movement was made during 
this news conference. Kennedy remarked, ―Let me say that I find it wholly inexplicable why the City Council of 
Albany will not sit down with the citizens of Albany, who may be Negroes, and attempt to secure them, in a 
peaceful way, their rights...We are going to attempt, as we have in the past, to try to provide a satisfactory solution 
and protection of the constitutional rights of the people of Albany, and will continue to do so. And the situation 
today is completely unsatisfactory from that point of view.‖ 
 66 
 
Albany campaign had already been deemed a failure and the administration was looking to avoid 
a possibly explosive confrontation with Albany city officials over civil rights.
146
    
Throughout the month of August, 1962 and well into September, a rash of black church 
bombings and violence against SNCC voter registration volunteers spread throughout the South. 
On September 10 in Ruleville, Mississippi, a group of white men fired shots into two homes 
which provided shelter for volunteers in the SNCC registration campaign. The use of fear tactics 
such as these shootings by racist whites succeeded in forcing SNCC volunteers out of the city.
147
   
Days after the Ruleville shootings, President Kennedy held a press conference in which 
he addressed the use of fear tactics by racist whites in the South, as well as the efforts to register 
voters in Albany. In his speech, JFK directed his focus towards the ―cowardly and outrageous‖ 
southern terrorists saying: 
I don‘t know any more outrageous action which I‘ve seen in this country for a good many 
months or years than the burning of a church- two churches- because of the effort made 
by Negroes, to be registered to vote…I commend those who are making the effort to 
register every citizen. They deserve the protection of the United States Government, the 





In his work Parting the Waters, Taylor Branch suggests that this speech was Kennedy‘s 
strongest statement on civil rights since his election. He writes, ―Given a shining opportunity to 
address the issues at the center of the administrations civil rights strategy- violence and voting 
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rights- Kennedy responded unequivocally.‖
149
 Dr. King was very pleased to hear the president 
finally take a stance for their cause. If JFK was beginning to show support for the victims of the 
attacks, then it might be possible for him to further push the idea for civil rights legislation. At a 
prayer service at the ruins of one of the bombed churches, he spoke about the meaning behind 
Kennedy‘s words, saying, ―We appreciate the strong and forthright words from the President of 




Yet, despite the powerful rhetoric, Kennedy continued to balk at the opportunity to issue 
any sort of civil rights legislation. Dr. King had been hoping that either the planned federal 
celebration for the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22 in Washington 
DC, or possibly a second ceremony on the January 1 celebration would be the perfect stage for 
the president to end all segregation. On May 17, 1962 King formally delivered a draft of his own 
proposed second Emancipation Proclamation to the White House. Much to his dismay, his idea 
to adapt Lincoln‘s own executive order to the needs of the African-American race one hundred 
years later by abolishing all southern segregation statutes was met with silence by the 
president.
151
 As the events involving civil rights activists continued to dominate a national debate 
in the black and white press, President Kennedy‘s hesitation towards issuing legislation steadily 
increased, evident by his reluctance to address neither publicly nor privately King‘s draft 
proclamation. 
Dr. King turned his attention to RFK, hoping that the Justice Department would be more 
willing to provide assistance to civil rights activists. Yet as the point man for the administration‘s 
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civil rights agenda, the attorney general continually aggravated King with his refusal to allow the 
civil rights leader to dictate Kennedy policy. RFK was steadfast in his strategy to encourage 
voter registration over direct activism. Harris Wofford recalled that while the two men could not 
see eye to eye in terms of the goals, pace and direction of the movement, they still held a mutual 
understanding that they were facing a similar foe in segregation. Wofford commented: 
The tension between King and Bob was inevitable. Here was this uncontrollable force, a 
moral force, a person who was as much his own man as Robert Kennedy was. Bob liked 
to control his agenda, and King‘s business was to overthrow people‘s agendas. King, I 
think, worried about Bobby. He worried that he wasn‘t morally committed enough. He 
didn‘t sense the passion in Bobby. On the other hand he had great hope that Bobby‘s 




John Seigenthaler shared a similar view of the relationship that developed between Kennedy and 
King. He reflected, ―Bob recognized the need for dramatic manifestations of civil rights work, 
but also the need for a very basic and pragmatic approach to the political problem…their was a 
shade of difference in their approach, but each recognized the good faith of the other.‖
153
 
At this point, however, Robert Kennedy was unwilling to provide the full extent of his 
power as the attorney general. The hostility of white southerners towards the Freedom Riders 
shocked RFK, and as a result the Justice Department as a whole began to back off criminal 
prosecutions against those who violated voting rights of blacks in the South, fearing similar 
demonstrations of violence. In a meeting with civil rights leaders, Burke Marshall warned that as 
a result of limited federal powers, the Justice Department could no longer provide protection 
guarantees to registration programs in the South. King and other civil right activists were 
frustrated with the Kennedy administration, claiming that they had led them down a path towards 
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The same month as the centennial celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation, a civil 
rights crisis came to a head in Oxford, Mississippi. On January 21, 1961 an African-American 
student named James H. Meredith applied for admission to the University of Mississippi. Despite 
meeting all required qualifications for attendance, Ole Miss officially denied his admission. 
Meredith immediately brought suit against the academic institution in a federal district court with 
the help of lawyers representing the NAACP. By early September 1962, federal courts ruled that 
Meredith had the legal right to attend the university. State officials in Mississippi, led by 
Governor Ross Barnett, strongly objected to the courts decision. Barnett declared that all state 
officials, himself included, should be willing to go to jail if necessary to prevent Meredith‘s 
admission.
155
 The governor even appeared on statewide television asking his constituents to join 
him in opposing the federal government‘s policy of destroying the white race, or as he called it 
―racial genocide.‖
156
 What began to unfold was an inevitable clash regarding the limitations of 
federal intervention with the functions of individual states. President Kennedy faced the daunting 
task of blending the will of the federal government with that of the individual states.  As a result, 
the White House became even more cautious towards becoming entrenched in a legal and 
ideological struggle with officials in Mississippi.  
Regardless of their hesitation, the Kennedy administration was steadfast in their 
determination to not to allow state officials the opportunity to dictate the outcome of the conflict 
at Ole Miss. On September 20, Attorney General Kennedy secured a safe escort of U.S. Marshals 
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and Justice Department attorneys for Meredith to the campus.
 157
 Upon arrival at the university, 
Barnett (who had been appointed by the Ole Miss Board of Trustees as a special registrar to deal 
with Meredith) was given a federal injunction by a Justice Department attorney which directed 
the registrar to admit Meredith. Ignoring the injunction, the governor proceeded to deny the 
young black man admission.
158
 Barnett‘s actions left RFK with few options. The following day 
the Justice Department filed a contempt of court citation against the university‘s chancellor, 
registrar, and dean, and obtained permission from the Court of Appeals to take over the case for 
Meredith in order to ensure the execution of the law.
159
 While Barnett attempted to maintain a 
political front of a southern leader who was unwilling to lose credibility with his constituents and 
southern colleagues by bending to pressure from federal demands, Kennedy continued to do 
everything in his power to avoid direct intervention. The administration was wary of evoking the 
memory of President Eisenhower sending the military into Little Rock, Arkansas in order to 




On September 30, RFK finally brokered a deal with Barnett that would allow Meredith to 
register. He was able to do so by threatening the governor, telling him he would release tapes of 
earlier negotiations between the two that the attorney general had secretly recorded throughout 
September. These tapes showed that Barnett had been working with the Kennedy administration 
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throughout the entire standoff. Not wanting to lose face in front of mounting political pressure, 
Barnett consented to Meredith‘s entry to the university, which ultimately led to mob violence 
and the death of two people.
161
  
Despite the dramatic events and violent outbursts in Oxford, the Kennedys continued to 
prefer indirect action through political process, which they believed would better serve the 
movement by means of gradual change. In his work, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, 
Richard Reeves comments: 
From the President‘s perspective, the problem with civil rights was that the Negroes and 
their white friends were pushing the most fundamental kind of attack on the status quo. 
Their righteous expectations, in that view, were based on an unrealistic political premise, 
thinking that the President alone had the power to persuade millions of free people- the 




Most important in the minds of African-Americans in the wake of Ole Miss, however, was the 
national exposure which the events had brought in forcing the hand of the administration to take 
any type of action, regardless of whether it was direct or indirect. In a front page editorial in the 
Chicago Defender, Lloyd L. General commented, ―[Meredith] was still being denied by bigots, 
but he had won battle after battle and he stood ready to face whatever struggles that lay ahead...in 
doing so he had thrust upon the federal government its obligation to protect the rights of its 
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 At the same time, though, some felt that the administration‘s reaction to the crisis in 
Oxford was setting a dangerous model for federal government intervention in response to civil 
rights confrontations. The Chicago Defender wrote, ―The Justice Department‘s failure to act with 
dispatch against Gov. Barnett‘s bold defiance of Federal court orders has set an unhealthy 
precedent for those who wish to thumb their noses at the law.‖
164
 This precedent which the 
newspaper spoke of reflected the continued reliance on political maneuvering to pacify the 
problem of civil rights which allowed the administration to avoid complete chaos and violence to 
erupt on a much larger scale.  
A result of the crisis however, was the recognition by JFK of the extent to which southern 
segregationists were prepared to go in order to maintain their social structure and traditions. In a 
report that was issued by the Mississippi legislature discussing the events at Ole Miss, federal 
marshals were blamed for instigating and planning physical torture against the students of the 
university. The president was stunned by the report and the interpretation of the violent clashes, 
and began to question how southerners truly envisioned the consequences of segregation. He 
commented to Ted Sorensen, ―It makes me wonder whether everything I learned about the evils 
of Reconstruction was really true.‖
165
  
For the Kennedys, the situation in Oxford had deteriorated to a point in which they were 
uncomfortable in having to take such direct action. As RFK would later say, ―I was trying to 
avoid basically having to send troops and trying to avoid having a federal presence in 
Mississippi…Barnett was trying to accomplish avoidance of integration…if he couldn‘t do that, 
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then he would be forced to do it by our heavy hand.‖
166
 Rather than take the initiative by calling 
in federal troops in a public show of force, the Kennedys preferred to continue their policy of 
private negotiations and political appeasement to resolve crises such as this. Neither the president 
nor his brother was pleased with the circumstances that had brought about the confrontation in 
Oxford which forced their intervention. The deliberate and dramatic defiance by African-
Americans such as Meredith forced the president to respond. These actions were continually 
frowned upon by both the president and attorney general, who viewed political maneuvering in 
pragmatic terms. Direct challenges by activists placed the Kennedys in an awkward position in 
which the events dictated their decision making rather than vice versa, a position which the 
brothers were uncomfortable with. The administration recognized that whether they wanted it or 
not, the reality was that civil rights had become an integral part of their political agenda. Yet as 
their hesitation during the crisis of Ole Miss demonstrates, they were still not prepared to make a 
full federal commitment towards the cause of civil rights, nor were they in complete agreement 
on how best to deal with such situations.  
**** 
African-Americans had high hopes that Kennedy would follow up on his campaign 
promise to put forward civil rights legislation. However, after three years of inaction in both the 
creation of that legislation and the administrations lack of commitment in aiding civil rights 
activists in the South, the black community had become disillusioned, realizing that real change 
in the form of federal aid would most likely not come. The Chicago Defender summarized these 
feelings in an editorial in which the author commented, ―I have believed all along that Mr. 
Kennedy is insincere on civil rights; that he thinks the Negro can be fooled by political 
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appointments, White House parties and pretty words. From a look at the record, it would appear 
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THE NORTH: WHEN I PULL THE TRIGGER…KISS IT GOODBYE 
 
The South Exposed at Birmingham 
 
The spring of 1963 brought about a new crisis that once again thrust the civil rights 
movement into the national forefront. Following the failure in Albany, Martin Luther King and 
Fred Shuttlesworth organized a series of protests in Birmingham, Alabama in early April. 
Similar to the events in Georgia, these demonstrations were largely unsuccessful as a result of 
the passive containment strategy of city officials, including Police Chief Bull Connor and Mayor 
Albert Boutwell. Birmingham police avoided direct confrontations with activists, and the bulk of 
the protests were localized within African-American neighborhoods. Civil rights organizers in 
the city became increasingly frustrated by the lack of gains. Up to this point, the presence of the 
national press had been virtually nonexistent in the city. King and Shuttlesworth realized that 
they needed the media to become actively involved if they were going to relate the message of 
the civil rights struggle to the nation and evoke some sort of emotional response which could 
provide the outrage necessary to force the federal government into action. As a result, 
Shuttlesworth traveled to Washington D.C. and appeared before the National Press Club in order 
to encourage the media to go to Birmingham and cover the events and efforts of the protesters.
168
 
On May 2, after lackluster results and few arrests, King and Shuttlesworth made the bold 
decision to flood department stores and lunch counters with thousands of child protesters. Bull 
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The national media captured images of the excessive police brutality towards the 
Birmingham protesters, prompting President Kennedy to comment upon seeing pictures of the 
violence on the front page of the New York Times, ―I think it‘s a terrible picture in the 
paper…It‘s an intolerable situation…we worked as hard as we possibly could given the laws we 
had. We have not done enough for a situation so desperate…I quite agree if I was a Negro I‘d be 
sore.‖
170
 The photographs made the president uncomfortable with the direction that the crisis in 
Birmingham had taken, yet he came away with no concrete plan that would help to rectify the 
situation. His pragmatism dictated that the situation in Alabama be resolved, but more as a 
political strategy than as a moralistic stance. He was more concerned with how the Soviet Union 
would perceive the pictures of violence, and how that would effect Cold War foreign relations as 
a result.
171
 This view was evident by a comment made during a meeting with a group of lobbyists 
that morning, in which JFK stated, ―There is no federal law we could pass…I mean what law can 
you pass to do anything about police power in Birmingham?...What a disaster that picture is. 
That picture is not only in America but all around the world.‖
172
 Historian Nick Bryant writes 
that Kennedy‘s discussion with the lobbyist group encapsulated the president‘s narrow view of 
one of the most extraordinary episodes of the entire civil rights era. Bryant argues that although 
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the Birmingham protests had been a watershed moment for the country, it was not for the 
president.  
In the days following the attack on the children, the White House was flooded with calls 
from various organizations and civic leaders urging the president to utilize the powers of his 
office to the fullest. New York Representative Emmanuel Celler petitioned the president, calling 
the actions of Birmingham‘s police ―barbarous‖, and advised Kennedy to exhibit ―firm executive 
action.‖
173
 JFK was unable, however, to grasp the greater scope that the events of Birmingham 
symbolized, that of the emerging public awareness of the brutality and injustice of segregation. 
What resulted instead was a subtle shift in tactics by the administration in their approach to civil 
rights, from that of conflict management to that of proactive conflict resolution.
174
 SCLC‘s Rev. 
Andrew J Young commented on the effectiveness of this new strategy, ―Up to that point, 
settlements in civil rights had involved the courts, or some kind of presidential order, or 
something very official. But now you began to get a kind of unofficial, personal reconciliation 
with both blacks and whites, which was very new.‖
175
  
In an effort to prevent further violence, President Kennedy incorporated this new strategy 
by sending Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall to Alabama to secretly negotiate a peace 
between local white and black businessmen. By May 10, Marshall was able to broker a deal 
between the two sides that would result in the gradual desegregation of lunch counters, rest 
rooms, and theaters throughout the city.
176
 Despite the success in gaining integration in the city, 
the black press, for the most part unaware of the behind the scenes negotiations by the 
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administration, responded with criticism to the lack of direct public intervention and support by 
the Kennedy brothers. The Chicago Defender wrote: 
The Kennedy Administration has reached the moment of truth on the burning issue of 
civil rights…But tokenism will not satisfy the swelling chorus of indignation which is 
directed against an Administration which…fails to take action when Negro ministers and 
teen-aged Negro children are knocked to the ground by high pressure water hoses and 





Hopes of a peaceful resolution following the negotiations by Marshall were left in doubt 
after the bombing of activist Rev. A.D. King‘s house. No longer willing to adhere to the ideals of 
non-violence, enraged African-Americans in Birmingham took to the streets and began rioting 
within their own community. The clashes between black rioters and city police resulted in the 
stabbing of a white police officer.
178
 Although a political shift of power within the city resulting 
in Bull Connor leaving office allowed the Birmingham agreement to hold, once again the course 
of action and silence from the White House came under criticism by the African-American press. 
The Chicago Defender wrote, ―The President- like his predecessor, General Eisenhower, 
inevitably waits until the fat is in the fire before making decisive moves. He did it in the James 
Meredith situation. He did it in Birmingham.‖
179
  
Violence continued to spread throughout the South in the weeks following the 
Birmingham agreement as riots broke out in Jackson, Mississippi. Angered by white official‘s 
refusal to create a bi-racial committee and employ black policemen, blacks in Jackson clashed 
with police.
180
 In order to resolve the situation, the president made a series of private phone calls 
to Jackson mayor Allen Thompson and negotiated a resolution to defuse the racial tensions 
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within the city. He told Allen, ―[blacks] have to look like when they call off these demonstrations 
that they‘re getting somewhere. Now it should be possible in this meeting to work out some 
language which would save your situation and at the same time not make it look like they‘ve all 
quit.‖
181
 Although John F. Kennedy recognized that the introduction of new civil rights 
legislation was inevitable, he still believed that the best way to resolve these situations was 




A New Front Emerges 
 
A significant turning point in the path towards the creation of civil rights legislation that 
directly resulted from the rioting in the South, was the recognition by the Kennedy 
administration that their policy of appeasement and containment would yield minimal results in 
creating genuine lasting change for blacks and their pursuit of equality. An important difference 
that resulted from the Birmingham crisis as opposed to previous events was the impression left 
on the Kennedy administration, as well as the rest of the nation, of black rioters utilizing violence 
as an outlet for their mounting frustration. Although the president and his advisers had focused 
solely on gaining immediate results from the conflict, it was Robert Kennedy who suggested that 
the administration begin to broaden the scope of their civil rights strategy. Discussing the issue 
with his brother, Robert said: 
The group that has gotten out of hand has been the Negroes, by and large…We feel that 
based on the success that they had in Birmingham, and the feeling of the Negroes 
generally, and the reports that we get from other cities, not just in the South, that this 
could trigger off a good deal of violence around the country now. The Negroes‘ saying 
that they have been abused for all these years, and they are going to have to start 
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following the ideas of the Black Muslims, not go along with the white people. If they 
feel, on the other hand, that the federal government is their friend, and is intervening for 




RFK recognized that the violent response of those in Birmingham was not an anomaly, and that 
an ideological shift in tactics away from passivism was gaining a strong foothold within the 
black community that would be difficult to contain.  
The Kennedy administration also realized that the problems of racial equality and the 
threat of black violence were not limited exclusively to the South. The attorney general would 
note in a speech to the New York City Central Labor Council, ―There is no question that 
segregation in the South is socially, politically and morally wrong. But there is deep-seated 
segregation in the North, also, and it is just as wrong.‖
184
 Racial tensions were rising amongst 
African-Americans throughout northern cities, and would have to be dealt with by the president. 
The frustration of blacks in the North was evident in the writings and words of prominent figures 
such as novelist James Baldwin and Dr. Kenneth Clark. In an interview for U.S. News, Clark 
discussed the mindset of blacks in northern urban communities. He commented, ―The mood of 
the Negro today is that he must have the same rights that every other American citizen enjoys- 
no matter what the cost…he wants those rights now. He is tired of waiting.‖
185
  
At the center of the rising tensions and impatience that was becoming apparent to the 
Kennedy administration was the system of de facto segregation. This type of segregation had its 
basis economically, creating a system that trapped blacks in a state of poverty while providing 
minimal opportunities for advancement. In 1948 the Supreme Court outlawed racially restrictive 
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housing covenants. Despite this ruling, however, established white ethnic groups, such as the 
Irish, Italian and Jewish, who controlled housing made private pledges to not sell or lease to 
blacks in order to maintain racial hegemony within their own neighborhoods. The practice of 
―redlining‖ was also an obstacle that blacks seeking housing had to face. Redlining was a form 
of discrimination in which bankers and mortgage brokers would circle areas on city maps in red 
pencil which they regarded as too insecure to grant mortgages. Real estate brokers agreed that 
they would not show potential black homeowners any housing outside of these penciled off 
areas. Thus blacks were forced to seek housing in dilapidated tenement projects within the red 




In a similar fashion, opportunities for employment were also limited. Most northern 
blacks who worked were usually confined to jobs which had little chance for advancement, jobs 
such as unskilled industrial laborers. With limited housing available, the arrival of over a million 
blacks in northern ghettos during the 1960s led to overcrowding and a high rate of 
unemployment throughout the black community. Historian Robert Weisbrot writes that this type 
of segregation created resentment in northern blacks, since ―no Jim Crow laws advertised their 
agony or stirred protests that aroused national concern. Instead racism worked in subtler ways to 
make ghetto residents the forgotten people of the Negro revolution.‖
187
 This environment of 
hopelessness and poverty fueled feelings of resentment, anger, and limitless frustration that 
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would inevitably be released through means of violence and brutality. James Baldwin, in his 
work My Dungeon Shook, wrote of the social barriers that were thrust upon young blacks in the 
ghettos. In the essay, written as a letter to his newborn nephew, he observes: 
You were born and faced the future that you faced because you were black and for no 
other reason. The limits of your ambition were, thus, expected to be set forever. You 
were born into a society which spelled out with brutal clarity, and in as many ways as 
possible, that you were a worthless human being. You were not expected to aspire to 




Civil rights activist James Farmer discussed the plight of a new generation of northern blacks in 
1963, saying, ―Walking in the streets of Harlem, I saw more clearly than I have before how 
young men who feel that nothing is being done about grievances so deep they can barely 
articulate them, will finally spring to violence.‖
189
 
The growing spite that was emerging in northern ghettos and the feeling of desperation 
was reflected in the shifting attitude of African-Americans away from the policy of non-violent 
passive resistance that was preached by such leaders as Dr. King. Political historian Theodore 
Windt describes this shift as part of the natural process of a liberal public protest movement. He 
writes that during the initial stages of a mass movement, the purpose of the dominant group of 
protesters is to arouse sympathy and support amongst the power elites, which can include the 
press and legislators. They appeal to these elites by means of identification, demonstrating a 
common belief system of values, while at the same time ensuring them that they have no 
intention of usurping the position of the group in power. Part of this development, however, is 
the inevitable emergence of radicals who carry a more desperate and inflammatory message that 
will amplify the desires of the dominant protest group. Windt describes the appearance of 
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radicals as being critical to furthering the message of the dominant group while incorporating 
new tactics and ideals that may have stood on the periphery. He writes, ―Even as procedural 
politics and deliberative rhetoric govern this period, radicals stand in the background rendering 
ideological analyses and wait for the day when others catch up to them or realize the futility of 
their rhetoric.‖
190
   
This process, and the turn by many blacks to radical ideology was reflected in northern 
urban cities. While the activism of SCLC, CORE, and SNCC dominated the headlines, blacks in 
the North found few opportunities that would help to expose their own depravity to a nation 
whose main focus was on the plight of the black equality movement in the South. Baldwin 
described this shift away from King‘s rhetoric of passivism, and of the leader himself: 
[King] is a very great man…He really believes in non-violence. He has arrived at 
something in himself which allows him to do it, and he still has great moral authority in 
the South. He has none whatsoever in the North. Poor Martin has gone through God 
knows what kind of hell to awaken the American conscience, but Martin has reached the 
end of his rope…Martin is undercut by the performance of the country. The country is 




In an attempt to vent their frustrations, Baldwin felt that many northern black youths were 
straying away from the ideals of non-violent resistance, and instead accepting those of the Black 
Muslim movement. In stark contrast to King, Baldwin suggested that leaders of the Black 
Muslim‘s, such as Malcolm X, had ―great authority over any of his audiences. He corroborates 
their reality; He tells them [blacks] that they really exist.‖
192
 Clark reflected the changing attitude 
when he discussed the growing acceptance in the North of the Black Muslim movement saying, 
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―Negro youths seem to feel that they can not hope for justice from white Americans…Many of 
these youngsters who express to us the Muslim philosophy say ―We‘re not Muslims. But what 
the Muslims say is true: You can‘t trust the white man.‖
193
 Radicals such as the Black Muslims 
offered northern blacks a new alternative to the message of pacification of Dr. King and other 
mainstream civil rights organizations. These radicals would not accept the political and social 




The emergence of a new radical approach had its roots in the urban ghetto, and its 
message was carried by the youthful second generation of activists who were beginning to 
emerge in leadership positions in the North. This new generation openly questioned the strategy 
of wearing the antagonists down through suffering. The feeling of mistrust and frustration left 
northern cities in a precarious state of racial tension, a juxtaposition that contrasted the token 
civil rights gains of the South with the desperation and feelings of futility in the North. Radical 
activist Julius Lester echoed this sentiment, writing, ―The days of singing freedom songs and the 
days of combating bullets and billy clubs with love are over. ‗We Shall Overcome‘ sounds old, 
outdated. Man, the people are too busy getting ready to fight to bother with singing anymore.‖
195
 
In response to the growing animosity that was festering amongst northern blacks during 
the early months of the summer of 1963, the National Urban League proposed a plan to temper 
hostilities that were developing in what they described as ―a tinder-box of racial unrest among 
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Negroes in Northern cities that was on the verge of taking flame.‖
196
 While discussing the plan to 
eliminate ghettos and provide more employment to African-American workers, League 
executive director Whitney M. Young Jr. publicly criticized JFK for his failure to advance civil 
rights legislation. Young asserted that the Kennedys ―have only reacted, they have not acted. 
Their attitude has been: How can we keep people from revolting and demonstrating and 
embarrassing us?‖
197
 He went on to say that incidents in the South were, ―mild in comparison 
with those…in Northern cities. In these teeming Northern ghettos, hundreds of thousands of 
Negro citizens, struggling beneath the mounting burden of automation, overcrowding and subtle 
discrimination are reaching their breaking point.‖
198
 The Chicago Defender mirrored Young‘s 
point, commenting, ―A new Negro has arisen on the scene, and he is impatient at…the snail‘s 
pace at which integration is moving, the continued token acceptance…are driving the negro 
masses to extreme means to attain their equity and full citizenship status.‖
199
  
More than any other member of the Kennedy administration, RFK was aware of the 
serious threat that violence from the North could have on race relations throughout the country. 
On May 19 he and Burke Marshall met with activist Dick Gregory, and voiced his concerns over 
the possibility of a future escalation in northern urban ghettos. On the flight back from the 
meeting, Kennedy and Marshall agreed that in order to temper the agitation that was apparent in 
the black community, legislation would have to be created which would address public 
accommodations.
200
 Reporting to his brother and his inner circle of advisers the following day, 
RFK told the president that Gregory ―thinks we‘re going to have a lot of trouble. He thinks that 
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there‘s a complete lack of understanding…that that‘s going to be the big problem area; it‘s going 
to be the northern cities.‖
201
 Burke Marshall added that the key point made by Gregory was that 
―the Negro mass in the North, particularly, doesn‘t see anything except the dogs and hoses.‖ 
Robert explained to his brother that they had arrived at a critical moment in the movement, as 
blacks in the North were antagonistic, and coupled with the fact that the leaders of the various 
civil rights organizations were all competing with each other instead of creating a united front, 
the situation had the potential to get out of control on a broad scale.  
The most compelling factor in RFK‘s advice that stood out to the group was the 
suggestion that King had lost his stranglehold of influence over the black populace. The gospel 
of nonviolence had begun to lose its effectiveness, and for the Kennedy administration, that 
meant the loss of a containable approach to civil rights. The Gandhian tactics of nonviolence had 
played a pivotal role in the civil rights protests of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and although 
they had frustrated the Kennedys for their insistence in pushing forth the agenda of black 
equality, they had accepted it because they knew that they could, to a certain extent, control it. 
Nonviolent resistance afforded the administration the freedom to manipulate and work the back 
channels of the political machinery in the South in order to attain acceptable results that would 
not be detrimental to the overall agenda of the White House. The advent of black radicalism and 
the threat of violence, however, added a variable to the equation of civil rights protests which the 
Kennedys realized they would have no control over. Their pragmatism would be futile in the face 
of widespread rioting and bloodshed, placing them in the exact position in which they were most 
uncomfortable. The threat of hostile action within the black community forced the hand of the 
administration to create legislation in order to placate the growing threat of violence. 
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Heeding the advice of his younger sibling, JFK made the tentative decision during the 
meeting on May 20 to go forward with the creation of a new civil rights bill. Although he had 
been hesitant to do so, fearing that the introduction of civil rights legislation would hinder his 
ability to run a successful reelection campaign without losing the support of southern Democrats, 
the president recognized that the argument being put forth by RFK of growing hostility that 
threatened to escalate necessitated action on his part. Burke Marshall would recall that, ―[RFK] 
thought it was not just the future of the presidency, but the future of the country that was at stake, 
and so, he urged the President very strongly to go ahead with the bill.‖
202
 During the meeting, 
Robert suggested that legislation which would address public accommodations and school 
desegregation would be a good option for the president to take, saying, ―If we can get those bills 
by, it would be damn helpful. Good for the Negroes, relax this thing.‖
203
 
In the wake of the events in Birmingham, the strategy of reacting to individual crises had 
lost its effectiveness. The natural solution, from the standpoint of the executive branch, was to 
create the legislation that King and other activists had long been calling for. The timing of the 
violence in Birmingham, and the media coverage of it, presented the administration with the 
perfect opportunity to take this course of action. The situation in the North and the willingness to 
react with aggression by blacks in the South demonstrated the need for a broader resolution that 
would effectively address the problem of racial inequality. Robert Kennedy would later reflect 
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that the administration had two ways of dealing with the racial crisis, ―Either to protect people, 
or to deal with the substantive problem that caused these difficulties. We didn‘t feel that the 
protection of people was feasible or acceptable under our constitutional system…what was 
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THE MEETING: THE GULF IS WIDE 
 
Baldwin and The Fire Next Time 
 
With the expectation that he would come away with a better understanding of the 
developing racial crisis amongst blacks in northern cities, Robert Kennedy arranged to meet with 
James Baldwin at the attorney general‘s home in McLean, Virginia in late May, 1963. Baldwin‘s 
work, Letter from a Region in My Mind, had been published in The New Yorker, and had 
received high accolades from the black and white community alike. In the essay, Baldwin gave 
an honest assessment of the social realities which blacks were subjected to from birth. He wrote: 
One did not have to be very bright to realize how little one could do to change one‘s 
situation; one did not have to be abnormally sensitive to be worn down to a cutting edge 
by the incessant and gratuitous humiliation and danger one encountered every working 
day, all day long…Negroes in this country are taught really to despise themselves from 
the moment their eyes open to this world. This world is white and they are black. White 
people hold the power, which mean they are superior to blacks, and the world has 
innumerable ways of making this difference known and felt and feared. Long before the 
Negro child perceives this difference, and even before he understands it, he has begun to 




Having read Letter from a Region, Kennedy was moved by the bluntness in which Baldwin 
described the plight of poor blacks and the dismal level of expectations placed on them as they 
grew up in urban communities. In 1961, JFK had appointed Robert to head the Presidents 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.
206
 During his exploratory studies of the causes of juvenile 
delinquency, RFK had come across the issue of urban poverty and its effects on the racial crisis. 
In the month after Birmingham, he sent a memorandum to the president in which he wrote, ―in 
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northern slums, the basic problems of jobs, training, and housing may take more than a 
generation to resolve.‖ Echoing the writings of Baldwin, Robert thought that the futility that had 
become so prevalent in urban black communities had its origins in the disparity that was 
burdened upon black children. He made the suggestion to his brother that the Kennedy 




RFK continued to be troubled by the possibility that the events in Birmingham provoking 
black rage might quickly spread to northern cities. The country was not yet aware of the 
legislation that the Kennedy administration was preparing, and the threat of violence continued 
to linger over black communities in the North and South. He was intent on exploring possible 
avenues in which the federal government could reach out to these people and create solutions 
that would address the root problems within the ghettos. The initiation of the meeting continued 
to demonstrate the lasting effect that Birmingham had left on the attorney general, that of a 
personal recognition that the policy of mediation and reaction could not properly combat the 
growing militancy that was evident throughout the country.  
Burke Marshall arranged the meeting between RFK and the novelist at Kennedy‘s home 
at Hickory Hill. As they sat and had breakfast, Baldwin spoke of the burden and inequalities 
facing blacks in cities throughout the North. Kennedy, always looking for pragmatic solutions, 
asked him what could be done to alleviate those problems. As Marshall later recalled, ―Baldwin 
hadn‘t the foggiest idea.‖
208
 Robert suggested that Baldwin gather a group of northern black 
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intellectuals to meet with him in New York City, a setting that would allow them to seek 
substantive answers.  
On May 24, RFK met with an eclectic group of whites and blacks that had been hastily 
brought together by Baldwin with the expectation of facilitating a discussion on the developing 
crisis in the northern urban areas and the growing popularity of the Black Muslims.
209
 Expecting 
a group of leading activists and intellectuals from the black community, Kennedy and Marshall 
were instead met by a group which included Baldwin, his brother David, singer Lena Horne, 
activist Harry Belafonte, African-American playwright Lorraine Hansberry, Dr. Kenneth Clark, 
Edwin C. Berry, white actor Rip Torn, King‘s lawyer Clarence Jones, and a CORE Freedom 
Rider named Jerome Smith.
210
 Baldwin would later say that the diversity of the group was 
intentional, as he wanted, ―as wide and even as rowdy a range of opinion as possible.‖
211
 The 
novelist also felt that the purpose of the meeting would be for the group to impress on Kennedy 
―the extremity of the racial situation‖ in the North and the ―anger of quickening urgency, of 
deepening alienation‖ felt by the northern blacks.
212
 
The meeting lasted two and a half hours, and although it had been originally envisioned 
by the attorney general to be an informative and intellectual discussion on the issue of race 
relations, it quickly digressed into an attack by those in attendance criticizing the civil rights 
policies of the White House. Kennedy began by cautioning the group about the extremism of 
Black Muslims, at which point he was interrupted by Jerome Smith. Smith told the attorney 
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general, ―You don‘t have no idea what trouble is…when I pull the trigger, kiss it goodbye.‖
213
 
Smith was referring to the idea that the real problem that whites would have to deal with was not 
the Black Muslim, but the African-American youth who had seen the kind of brutal treatment by 
southern whites that he himself had witnessed during his time as a Freedom Rider. Smith had 
been severely beaten in McComb, Mississippi by a white mob in 1961, and had experienced 
similar violence on several other occasions. The young Freedom Rider had been such an 
advocate of nonviolent resistance, that he had been nicknamed ‗Gandhi Two‘ by his fellow 
activists.
214
 He was frustrated and jaded by the Kennedy administration‘s unwillingness to create 
civil rights legislation. Baldwin later commented that ―[Smith] set the tone of the meeting 
because he stammers when he‘s upset. He stammered when he talked to Bobby…and Bobby 
took it personally.‖
215
 To RFK‘s surprise, Smith told the attorney general that being in the same 
room as him made him want to vomit.
216
  
After an awkward pause, Kennedy tried to steer the conversation back to the events of 
Birmingham and Mississippi, or as Baldwin would later call it, ―the same old stuff.‖
217
 However, 
Lorraine Hansberry interjected by saying, ―Mr. Kennedy, he [Smith] is the voice of 20 million 
Americans and he is the most important man in this room.‖
218
 Baldwin recalled that after 
Hansberry‘s comment, the group began to become agitated about RFK‘s apparent lack of 
sympathy and comprehension, saying, ―It got worse. Bobby didn‘t understand what we were 
trying to tell him; he didn‘t understand our urgency. For him it was a political matter…but what 
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was wrong [was] something very sinister, very deep, that couldn‘t be solved in the usual way.‖
219
 
Sensing an opportunity to create further discussion and antagonize Kennedy, Baldwin asked 
Smith if he would ever fight for the United States in a war against Cuba. Smith responded, 
―Never! Never! Never!‖
220
 Kennedy was outraged that any citizen would refuse to defend his 
country, and pointed out to the group that his Irish grandparents had been immigrants and had 
overcome similar prejudices. Baldwin retorted that his own family had been in the same country 
for longer than three generations and yet were still stuck at the bottom of the social sphere.
221
 
Following this remark, Kennedy tried to salvage the meeting by praising the work of the Justice 
Department lawyers in black voting rights cases. The group responded with laughter, a laughter 
that Clark commented was, ―the laughter of desperation.‖
222
  
After two hours the final comment came from Lorraine Hansberry, who praised black 
men and the role they had played in the movement, and concluded by saying, ―Mr. Attorney 
General, I am very worried about the state of a civilization which produces that white cop 
standing on that Negro woman‘s neck in Birmingham.‖
223
 Hansberry then stood up, thanked 
Kennedy for listening, and left the room. The rest of the group followed her lead and walked out 
of the apartment, leaving Kennedy to reflect on the frustration he felt by the experience. He 
would later observe that those who attended the meeting: 
Started sort of competing with each other in attacking us, the President, the federal 
government…People got madder and madder when they thought about the treatment of 
Negroes…The way to show that they hadn‘t forgotten where they came from was to 
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berate me and berate the United States government that had made this position a 




Baldwin‘s own view on the meeting mirrored that of the attorney general, though for him it was 
RFK who did not fully understand the facts. Following the meeting, the novelist was quoted in 
the New York Times saying that Kennedy did not ―understand the full extent of the growing 
racial strife in the North.‖
225
 He also told Newsweek that there was a ―gulf‖ that divided Harlem 
and McLean, saying, ―He [Kennedy] just didn‘t get the point. He was naïve, he doesn‘t know 





A critical transition in the outlook of Robert Kennedy towards civil rights took place in 
the weeks following the Baldwin meeting. Journalist Jack Newfield observed that Robert ―forged 
his consciousness out of what he saw and felt…they helped him invent himself through personal 
engagement…his emotions made him open and vulnerable to the immediate moment.‖
227
 The 
discussion between the attorney general and the Baldwin group signified the first time in which 
Kennedy had been confronted by a group of African-Americans who were willing to bluntly 
portray the despair and dissatisfaction that they felt over their social standing and the policies of 
his brother‘s administration. Until that point, the Kennedy administration had advocated a civil 
rights policy that dealt with problems on a case by case basis. If a crisis regarding race relations 
or segregation arose, they would take appropriate legal action to temper that particular situation. 
Victor Navasky writes that this strategy was calculated: 
                                                 
224
 Guthman, In His Own Words, 225. 
225
 New York Times, 26 May 1963, 1. 
226
 Newsweek, 3 June 1963, 19. 
227
 Newfield, RFK: A Memoir, 40-41. 
 95 
 
As each crisis surfaced, the [Attorney] General confidently approached it on the 
assumption that it was a temporary eruption which he and his remarkable team could 
cool…The trick was to encourage the inevitable integration but never at the cost of 
disturbing the social equilibrium. His most visible and most significant civil rights 




The problem facing RFK, was that throughout each of these crises in the Deep South there had 
never been a sense of urgency or willingness on the part of the federal government to rectify the 
root problem of racial inequality. There was rarely an effort made to look past the crisis at hand 
and delve into the overlying social factors that spawned the event. What the Kennedys failed to 
understand was that the importance placed by civil rights activists on the need for executive 
legislative action was deliberate. In contrast to the Kennedy strategy of voter registration, these 
activists understood that more than anything legislation would address the foundations of racial 
injustice first and foremost, and in doing so mandate social change.  
The Baldwin meeting made it clear to the attorney general that there existed a great sense 
of exigency from within the black populace that was not satisfied by the token gains of political 
maneuvering. It also demonstrated that the time frame for which the Kennedy administration had 
to act was diminishing with each failed opportunity to enact legislation. Going into the meeting, 
RFK thought that the work of the Justice Department had been enough to keep all sides content 
with what progress had been made. A significant moment for Robert Kennedy came when 
Jerome Smith told him that being in the same room as the attorney general made him physically 
ill. Smith had been on the roster of the original CORE Freedom Rides, had participated in the 
second leg of those rides, and was a well respected member of CORE‘s New Orleans branch. He 
had advocated the path of nonviolent resistance, and had been brutally beaten during the second 
round of Freedom Rides in the fall of 1961 by Ku Klux Klansmen. In essence, Smith was the 
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model activist who Kennedy had worked so diligently to protect the legal rights of during his 
first years in the Justice Department. He was not an agitator who willingly preached the new 
gospel of violence that was so readily gaining a foothold within the black community. Yet he sat 
face to face with the attorney general and told him bluntly that even for one as qualified and well 
versed in the tactics of peaceful resistance, time had run out. The pragmatic approach of the 
Kennedys could no longer coexist with the needs of the black community. The promises of the 
administration meant nothing unless they were backed by substantive action.  
The participants in the meeting interpreted RFK‘s silence to Smith‘s anger as being one 
in which the attorney general lacked understanding of the underlying meanings within the 
Freedom Riders words. Dr. Clark recounted, ―We were shocked that he was shocked and that he 
seemed unable to understand what Smith was trying to say.‖
229
 To the contrary, RFK understood 
every word that was being spoken to him, however he was not prepared to hear such a straight 
forward assessment of the failures of his department. Kennedy aide Nicholas Katzenbach 
commented, ―After Baldwin, he was absolutely shocked. Bobby expected to be made an 
honorary black. It really hurt his feelings, and it was pretty mean. But the fact that he thought he 
knew so much –and learned he didn‘t- was important.‖
230
 Kennedy recognized that for all of the 
progress that the administration thought they had accomplished in quelling civil rights crisis‘s, in 
the eyes of the average black person that had faced the brutality, degradation and hopelessness 
on a daily basis, the federal government‘s actions were nothing more than symbolic gestures. 
Historian William Chafe writes that in the wake of southern civil rights conflicts, most blacks 
became conscious of the fact that ―despite their sacrifice, most of the underlying problems 
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remained, largely because those in power felt no compulsion to alter established patterns once 
token concessions had been made.‖
231
 For all of his work in resolving civil rights clashes in the 
South, Robert Kennedy was finding that his own actions had little to do with finding solutions 
that would address the very foundations of black inequality and effectively create lasting change.  
The attorney general was beginning to grasp the depth of black anger that was evident 
throughout the country. It was during this time, Evan Thomas writes, that ―RFK made the leap 
from contempt to identification.‖ A few days after the Baldwin confrontation, he told Ed 
Guthman that ‗if he had grown up a Negro, he would feel as strongly as the Baldwin group.‘
232
 
He had come to the meeting with expectations of finding pragmatic answers, and instead came 
away with the reality that his efforts, and for that matter the efforts of his brother‘s 
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THE SHIFT: THE NEW APPROACH TO FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
 
Federal Employment and the Catalyst 
 
Although he was aggravated with the course that the meeting had taken, Robert Kennedy 
was able to channel that anger into recognition of the state of frustration that blacks felt. As 
friend Jack Newfield would observe, ―[Robert‘s] emotions made him open and vulnerable to the 
immediate moment. Kennedy was at his best whenever he suspended his reason and trusted his 
instincts.‖
233
 Robert‘s personality afforded him the opportunity to learn from moments in which 
he was able to bear witness to human suffering and pain. Author Peter Maas echoed this 
assessment, saying, ―Bob didn‘t change except through experience.‖
234
 While John was a 
consummate and controlled politician, Robert exuded emotion, a trait that left him vulnerable to 
personal experience. President Kennedy, for example, became conscious of the horrors of 
poverty by reading Michael Harrington‘s The Other America.
235
 RFK came to that same 
understanding only after touring ghettos and meeting children and families who were starving 
and burdened by their social condition. Newfield writes that ―For Robert Kennedy, the sight of 
one hungry black child had a greater impact than a million words or statistics.‖
236
 A similar 
experience presented itself during the Baldwin meeting. Standing face to face with Jerome 
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Smith, listening to the pain and desperation in the Freedom Rider‘s voice, Robert began to make 
the connection between the despair of African-Americans and the lack of substantive action on 
the part of the federal government. Baldwin would later comment that ―[Smith] became the focal 
point. I think that threw Kennedy. That boy, after all, in some sense, represented to everybody in 
that room our hope. Our honor. Our dignity. But, above all, our hope.‖
237
  
The Baldwin meeting provided the perfect forum for which RFK‘s emotions could 
supersede any calculated political thought. He was fueled by emotion and experience, and the 
gathering in New York allowed him the chance to examine his own understanding of civil rights 
and the human element of black suffering that he had at times overlooked during the first years 
of his brother‘s presidency. Evan Thomas writes that the attorney general was able to transform 
―his rage into outrage.‖
238
 He took the anger he felt as a result of the meeting and began to focus 
on the federal government‘s token policy of hiring African-Americans.  
Five days after the meeting, Robert stormed into a meeting of the Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, which was chaired by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. He had just 
read a report that analyzed minority employment of federal employees in Birmingham. Out of a 
possible two thousand jobs, only fifteen of them were held by African-Americans. The figure 
represented one percent of federal employees in a city whose black population consisted of 
thirty-seven percent of the overall population. RFK was infuriated by the report, and became 
livid when Burke Marshal, who had just returned from the city, told him ―I‘d gone into every 
federal office…and you couldn‘t even find a Negro sweeping the floor.‖ The attorney general 
openly berated Johnson, challenging his committee‘s reports that showed hundred percent 
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improvements in minority workforces, calling them ―phony statistics.‖
239
 Kennedy demanded 
that the federal government begin reanalyzing their minority hiring practices. 
What the Baldwin meeting demonstrated to RFK was that the level of animosity within 
the black community was not a regional problem, but one that was endemic to every part of the 
country, and one that penetrated all classes of African-Americans. The reality of the problem of 
black equality, and the sluggishness for which the Kennedy administration had taken in dealing 
with legislation was creating an even greater sense of frustration from an expectant and hopeful 
black community that was reaching their breaking point. Two weeks after the Baldwin meeting, 
the Afro-American wrote: 
Baldwin and Co. are correct in their conclusion that the Kennedys had not accurately 
judged the intensity of feeling about discrimination among our people or their burning 
determination to be free…Now they know we are sick of gradualism, of the denial of 
human dignity, of segregation, of second-class citizenship and that we fully intend to do 




The change in Robert Kennedy‘s rhetoric was apparent in his speeches and meetings in 
the weeks following the Baldwin meeting. On a flight to North Carolina just days after the 
encounter, RFK mentioned to Burke Marshall that the time had come to create true civil rights 
legislation that would go further than any of its predecessors by getting to the ―heart of the 
matter‖ and killing Jim Crow segregation.
 241
 In his commencement address at Trinity College on 
June 2, Kennedy reflected on the moral crisis that faced the nation when he told the audience, 
―The current crisis in civil rights for example…is an intensely human problem…Our answer to 
the extremists must be to move quickly in establishing those reforms which all of us know in our 
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hearts, should have been made long ago.‖
242
 That same week, the attorney general met with a 
delegation of Democratic senators and told them bluntly: 
The nation is in the midst of a civil rights crisis not only in the South but in the North. 
This is a terribly dangerous situation. These people are looking to the Federal government 
for the protection of their rights and often there is nothing we can do until we must send 




The final decision to go forth with civil rights legislation was finalized by the president 
following a meeting on June 1 in the Oval Office with his closest advisers, which included RFK, 
Burke Marshall, JFK, Ted Sorensen, and Lyndon B. Johnson.
244
  Kennedy presented the question 
to the group, ―What‘s going to be the result if we don‘t have any further legislation?‖ To which 
Marshall cut in, ―I don‘t think we really have an alternative. You couldn‘t go on and not have 
legislation…it‘s absolutely essential that you have legislation.‖ Historian Nick Bryant writes, 
―By the end of the meeting, Kennedy had crossed the Rubicon. He knew that further 
equivocation could engender further violence.‖
245
 The Kennedy administration had finally 
committed itself to civil rights legislation, and now needed to find an appropriate opportunity 
that would allow them to enact such a bold initiative. 
Robert Kennedy was aware that in order for his brother to propose a comprehensive civil 
rights bill, he would need a catalyst that would ease the acceptance and willingness to pass such 
legislation in both Congress and in the minds of the populace. The images of Bull Connor‘s 
brutality towards the children in Birmingham had shocked and horrified the nation, and the 
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Kennedys knew that they would need a symbol which would confirm the moral clarity that had 
been left in the wake of the fire hoses and police dogs. The catalyst they were looking for 
presented itself in the form of Alabama Governor George Wallace‘s public declaration to bar all 
black students from enrolling at the University of Alabama.
246
 
Upon his election to the governorship, Wallace had defiantly proclaimed that he would 
ensure that segregation would continue in the South. He was given the opportunity to back up his 
words when two black students, Vivian Malone and James Hood, gained admission to the 
University of Alabama. Disregarding a federal court order that banned interference by state 
officials, Wallace vowed to block the entrance to the registrar‘s office.
247
 Robert Kennedy had 
been preparing for Wallace‘s defiance for months in advance. Earlier that year, he had personally 
gone to Alabama and met with the governor. However, the meeting had been a total failure, as 
Wallace openly recorded the conversation between the two men in hopes of tricking the attorney 
general into saying something disparaging about the Alabama state government.
248
  
Hoping to avoid a similar situation of bloodshed that had been seen in Oxford, the White 
House took the initiative by negotiating with local Alabama entrepreneurs who had business 
connections with the governor, and who had no intention of having mob violence run rampant in 
their streets. By choosing to attack his business connections, the Kennedys hoped to put enough 
economic pressure on Wallace to force him to abandon his proposed public defiance.
249
 In order 
to ensure that state troops could not be used by the governor, JFK federalized the Alabama 
National Guard. It was exactly the kind of situation both the Kennedy brothers were comfortable 
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with. They had strategically positioned themselves to be in control of the crisis before it had 
reached a breaking point, and in doing so had provided the perfect opportunity to introduce the 
country to the idea of civil rights legislation. 
―I don‘t think you can get by without it‖ 
 
The night before Vivian Malone and James Hood were to enroll in the university, Robert 
discussed the subject of enacting the civil rights bill at a White House meeting, and advised his 
brother to go on national television and speak to the people about what that legislation would 
entail. When asked by several advisers whether he was willing to appear before the nation and 
speak on an issue that was so decisive, President Kennedy responded, ―I don‘t think so...‖ to 
which his brother interjected, ―I think it would be helpful…I don't think you can get by now 
without saying-- having an address on television, at least during this period of time, giving some 
direction and having it in the hands of the President.‖
250
 RFK would later recall, ―We were going 
to send up the legislation, and he [JFK] could talk about what we needed to accomplish…I think 
he pretty much made up his mind, after that conference, that he would speak.‖
251
 
President Kennedy rarely dealt firsthand with the problems of civil rights, relying instead 
on the judgment of his brother and his advisers. More than any other, though, JFK trusted first 
and foremost the opinion of his brother. Ignoring the advice to forego a television address by his 
closest aides, which included Ted Sorensen and Kenneth O‘Donnell, the president decided that 
he would speak to the nation and capitalize on Wallace‘s overt defiance. The lone voice of 
support came from the attorney general. Robert Kennedy understood more than any other 
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member of the president‘s inner circle that if civil rights legislation was going to be able to make 
a significant impact, it would have to be unilaterally accepted by both the United States Congress 
as well as the general public. Garnering enough support within Congress would require savvy 
political maneuvering on the part of the administration; however the public‘s willingness to 
accept proposed legislation would require a deeper moralistic appeal to the social consciousness 
of the populace. Anything less than dual support from the government and the public would 
subject the civil rights bill to a similar fate of previous legislation, in which watered down 
legislation resulted in little more than token gains. For this reason, the attorney general was 
steadfast in his belief that it was necessary for his brother to not only speak to the country about 
the proposals he wanted to make for black civil rights, but to do so with rhetoric that would make 
an appeal to the moral consciousness of the country.  RFK‘s suggestion was enough for the 
president to recognize that it was the right choice to make. As Marshall would later reflect: 
When President Kennedy sent up that [civil rights] bill every single person who spoke 
about it in the White House—every one of them—was against President Kennedy 
sending up that bill; against his speech in June; against making it a moral issue…The 
conclusive voice within the government at that time, there‘s no question about it at all, 
that Robert Kennedy was the one. He urged it, he felt it, he understood it. And he 
prevailed. I don‘t think there was anybody in the Cabinet—except the President 




The first draft of the civil rights legislation speech, written by Ted Sorensen, reflected the ideas 
and concerns that RFK had been stressing to his brother. Although discarded for the final speech, 
a section of the initial draft focused squarely on the de facto segregation that was so prevalent in 
northern cities, saying, ―Let no white Northerner delude himself for an instant with the notion 
that racial discrimination is chiefly a matter for Southern concern…the Northern Negro…must, 
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like his Southern brother, breathe the stifling air of oppression every day of his life.‖
253
 The draft 
portrayed the state of ghettoes in which black tenants paid exorbitant rents, faced employment 
discrimination, and were forced to send their children to overcrowded and understaffed schools 
in which black youths were more likely to drop out and join their parents in the ―seemingly 
endless treadmill of poverty and neglect and despair.‖
254
 The section that discussed the plight of 
northern blacks would be removed from the final draft of the speech in favor of a more universal 
approach to referencing de facto segregation, in which the president said, ―This is not a sectional 
issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in every city, in every State of the 
Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that threatens the public safety.‖
255
 
However, it is worth noting that the initial draft of the most important civil rights speech given 
during the Kennedy presidency mirrored the views and observations of Robert Kennedy, 
demonstrating the importance and weight of the attorney general‘s role as the administrations 
civil rights point man at such a critical juncture. 
The following day, with four hundred Army troops on alert at nearby Fort Benning, 
Justice Department officials carrying a cease and desist order from the president, and a 
federalized National Guardsmen escort, Malone and Hood arrived on the Tuscaloosa campus. 
Facing this overwhelming show of federal force, Wallace could do nothing more than read a 
defiant statement against integration and then step aside to allow both students to register.
256
 
That night, after watching a tape of Wallace‘s declaration, the President heeded his brother‘s 
advice and went on national television to speak to the country about the state of racial inequality 
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that existed, and the urgent need to rectify a ―moral crisis‖. In the speech, half of which was done 
extemporaneously, JFK discussed the social contradiction that existed, saying: 
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it. And we cherish our freedom here 
at home. But are we to say to the world- and much more importantly to each other- that 
this is the land of the free, except for the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens, 
except Negroes; that we have no class or caste ghettos, no master race, except with 




The president evoked the principles in which the country had been established, saying, ―This 
Nation was founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principle 
that all men are created equal, and that the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of 
one man are threatened.‖ Based on this idea alone, he continued, ―It ought to be possible, in 
short, for every American to enjoy the privileges of being American without regard to his race or 
his color. In short, every American ought to have the right to be treated as he would wish to be 
treated.‖
 258
 JFK concluded his address by commenting on the demonstrations that had been so 
prevalent during his presidency, saying, ―We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you 
can't have that right…that the only way that they are going to get their rights is to go into the 
streets and demonstrate. I think we owe them and we owe ourselves a better country than 
that.‖
259
   
John F. Kennedy proclaimed that the country faced a ―moral crisis‖ that could no longer 
be ignored or kept at bay. In doing so, the president altered the course of federal intervention in 
the civil rights movement. For the first time since the implementation of segregation, the 
executive branch was able to firmly offer the black community the moral leadership that they 
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desired. The response to the speech by the black media and the black community throughout the 
nation was one of admiration and relief. The Afro-American proclaimed, ―Kennedy‘s 
impassioned plea for Congressional action to insure freedom and racial justice was 




For those who had been in attendance at the Baldwin meeting, there was a sense of 
satisfaction in the wake of the president‘s address. To these participants, the urgency that they 
had hoped to portray to Robert F. Kennedy was reflected in the words of JFK‘s speech. It proved 
to them that while on the surface RFK seemed to barely comprehend their grievances, in fact the 
attorney general had come away from the meeting with an emerging awareness that was clearly 
reflected in the president‘s rhetoric. Dr. Kenneth Clark would later observe, ―We left convinced 
that we had made no dent or impact on Bobby…but then Jack Kennedy gave that famous civil 
rights speech, which contained many of the same ideas. So our conclusion that we had made no 
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The Baldwin meeting played an integral role in the evolution of Robert F. Kennedy‘s 
understanding of the civil rights movement, and concordantly altered the Kennedy 
administrations approach to civil rights. As the point man for the administration‘s civil rights 
policy, the onus fell upon the attorney general to incorporate the heightened expectations of the 
black community that had been created during the campaign of 1960 and blend them with the 
responsibilities of his own office. Throughout the initial years of the presidency this proved to be 
a difficult task, one in which RFK consistently found himself towing the line between his own 
moral sense and the obligation he had to ensure that the laws of the land were upheld. It was a 
complex conundrum, one that was seemingly amplified by his failure to comprehend and relate 
to the frustration and urgency that was consistently demonstrated by black activists. 
The Baldwin meeting therefore acted as a catalyst of change in which RFK was able to 
witness firsthand the resentment and raw emotion that he had yet to see directly from African-
Americans. Until that point, the crises that had preceded the meeting had all been handled from 
afar, with the administration coordinating and implementing their strategy from the detached 
environment of Washington D.C. Throughout the Kennedy presidency, the administration 
consistently avoided direct confrontations with civil rights organizations. When meetings did 
take place between the Kennedys and civil rights leaders, they were defined by formalities and 
cautiously proposed ideas. Black activists were weary of the potential power and influence with 
which the president and his brother held through their political office, and thus were reluctant to 
push the White House out of fear that they may alienate them from their cause. The Baldwin 
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meeting provided the first forum in which black activists were able to bluntly portray their 
frustration and desperation face to face with a high ranking member of the administration. It was 
a message that reflected the growing animosity and urgency within the African-American 
community, and it was delivered in an unabashed way. For Robert Kennedy it was precisely the 
type of approach that was necessary in order to elicit change, a personal attack fueled by passion. 
The events leading up to the Baldwin meeting in 1963 demonstrated that the Kennedy 
brothers, as a result of their upbringing and social status, were completely unprepared to step into 
a leadership role that would further the cause of black equality. Both John and Robert Kennedy 
had been raised in a world whose social sphere was separate from that of African-Americans. 
Through savvy political maneuvering, the brothers had been able to incorporate the issue of civil 
rights and adapt them for their own purposes. The rhetoric of the 1960 campaign stressing the 
need for moral leadership, coupled with the promise of racial equality had been enough to win 
the black vote. However, during the initial years of the presidency the exigency that was 
consistently demonstrated within the black community for immediate change was a concept that 
was too unfamiliar to the Kennedy brothers to be dealt with properly. They had neither the 
understanding of black inequality nor the unjust system of segregation that would allow them to 
effect positive and permanent change. Instead they chose to react rather than act, allowing 
activists and demonstrators to dictate the administration‘s civil rights policy. 
The confrontation between Robert F. Kennedy and the Baldwin participants marked the 
beginning of a transition that would alter the attorney general‘s mindset towards civil rights. 
Activist John Lewis would later write about Robert Kennedy, ―the man who had been reviled by 
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so many of us, including me, for his foot dragging...I came to respect enormously… he was 
willing to listen, and learn, and change.‖
262
 Harry Belafonte would mirror this sentiment:  
In the process of these appeals we found in him an awakening to so many things that he 
had misunderstood and dismissed. It bothered him that he sat in such a position of 
enormous ignorance on the subject. Much to his credit his curiosity peaked more 
intensely to see what we were talking about and wanted him to do and that became his 





RFK had seen firsthand the enmity that existed throughout the country within African-American 
communities. The impact of the Baldwin meeting was a definitive moment in which the realities 
of the state of the civil rights struggle became a part of his own political outlook, and helped play 
an integral factor in swaying his brother to take an active role in the creation of legislation. The 
legacy of inaction from the first three years of the Kennedy presidency came to an end as a result 
of the final decision by the president and his brother to create federal civil rights legislation. 
The personal barriers defined by moralistic idealism and the desire to protect his brother 
and the public image of the presidency began to erode as RFK became exposed to the social 
reality of blacks living in the United States. The inability to comprehend the deeper issues that 
lay at the foundation of the system of segregation, clearly demonstrated by the mishandling of 
civil rights crises throughout the initial years of the Kennedy presidency, began to evolve into a 
greater understanding of black suffering that would help shape the federal government‘s 
approach to civil rights in the ensuing years. 
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Good evening, my fellow citizens, 
      This afternoon, following a series of threats and defiant statements, the presence of 
Alabama National Guardsmen was required on the University of Alabama to carry out the final 
and unequivocal order of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Alabama. 
That order called for the admission of two clearly qualified young Alabama residents who 
happened to have been born Negro.  
      That they were admitted peacefully on the campus is due in good measure to the conduct 
of the students of the University of Alabama, who met their responsibilities in a constructive 
way.  
      I hope that every American, regardless of where he lives, will stop and examine his 
conscience about this and other related incidents. This Nation was founded by men of many 
nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that 
the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened.  
      Today we are committed to a worldwide struggle to promote and protect the rights of all 
who wish to be free. And when Americans are sent to Viet-Nam or West Berlin, we do not ask 
for whites only. It ought to be possible, therefore, for American students of any color to attend 
any public institution they select without having to be backed up by troops.  
      It ought to be possible for American consumers of any color to receive equal service in 
places of public accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and retail stores, 
without being forced to resort to demonstrations in the street, and it ought to be possible for 
American citizens of any color to register and to vote in a free election without interference or 
fear of reprisal.  
      It ought to be possible, in short, for every American to enjoy the privileges of being 
American without regard to his race or his color. In short, every American ought to have the 
right to be treated as he would wish to be treated, as one would wish his children to be treated. 
But this is not the case.  
      The Negro baby born in America today, regardless of the section of the Nation in which 
he is born, has about one-half as much chance of completing a high school as a white baby born 
in the same place on the same day, one-third as much chance of completing college, one-third as 
much chance of becoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becoming unemployed, 
about one-seventh as much chance of earning $10,000 a year, a life expectancy which is 7 years 
shorter, and the prospects of earning only half as much.  
      This is not a sectional issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in 
every city, in every State of the Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that 
threatens the public safety. Nor is this a partisan issue. In a time of domestic crisis men of good 
will and generosity should be able to unite regardless of party or politics. This is not even a legal 
or legislative issue alone. It is better to settle these matters in the courts than on the streets, and 
new laws are needed at every level, but law alone cannot make men see right.  
    We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as 
clear as the American Constitution.  
    The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and 
equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. 
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he 
cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the public 
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officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us 
want, then who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his 
place? Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay?  
    One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet 
their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice. 
They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation, for all its hopes 
and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its citizens are free.  
    We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it, and we cherish our freedom here 
at home, but are we to say to the world, and much more importantly, to each other that this is a 
land of the free except for the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens except Negroes; 
that we have no class or cast system, no ghettos, no master race except with respect to Negroes?  
    Now the time has come for this Nation to fulfill its promise. The events in Birmingham 
and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can 
prudently choose to ignore them.  
    The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, North and South, where 
legal remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades, and 
protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.  
    We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by 
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be 
quieted by token moves or talk. It is a time to act in the Congress, in your State and local 
legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives.  
    It is not enough to pin the blame on others, to say this is a problem of one section of the 
country or another, or deplore the fact that we face. A great change is at hand, and our task, our 
obligation, is to make that revolution, that change, peaceful and constructive for all.  
    Those who do nothing are inviting shame as well as violence. Those who act boldly are 
recognizing right as well as reality.  
    Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it 
has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or 
law. The Federal judiciary has upheld that proposition in a series of forthright cases. The 
executive branch has adopted that proposition in the conduct of its affairs, including the 
employment of Federal personnel, the use of Federal facilities, and the sale of federally financed 
housing.  
    But there are other necessary measures which only the Congress can provide, and they 
must be provided at this session. The old code of equity law, under which we live commands for 
every wrong a remedy, but in too many communities, in too many parts of the country, wrongs 
are inflicted on Negro citizens and there are no remedies at law. Unless the Congress acts, their 
only remedy is in the street.  
    I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all Americans the right to 
be served in facilities which are open to the public - hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and 
similar establishments.  
    This seems to me to be an elementary right. Its denial is an arbitrary indignity that no 
American in 1963 should have to endure, but many do.  
    I have recently met with scores of business leaders urging them to take voluntary action 
to end this discrimination and I have been encouraged by their response, and in the last 2 weeks 
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over 75 cities have seen progress made in desegregating these kinds of facilities. But many are 
unwilling to act alone, and for this reason, nationwide legislation is needed if we are to move this 
problem from the streets to the courts.  
    I am also asking Congress to authorize the Federal Government to participate more fully 
in lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education. We have succeeded in persuading 
many districts to desegregate voluntarily. Dozens have admitted Negroes without violence. 
Today a Negro is attending a State-supported institution in every one of our 50 States, but the 
pace is very slow.  
    Too many Negro children entering segregated grade schools at the time of the Supreme 
Court's decision 9 years ago will enter segregated high schools this fall, having suffered a loss 
which can never be restored. The lack of an adequate education denies the Negro a chance to get 
a decent job.  
    The orderly implementation of the Supreme Court decision, therefore, cannot be left 
solely to those who may not have the economic resources to carry the legal action or who may be 
subject to harassment.  
    Other features will be also requested, including greater protection for the right to vote. 
But legislation, I repeat, cannot solve this problem alone. It must be solved in the homes of every 
American in every community across our country.  
    In this respect, I want to pay tribute to those citizens North and South who have been 
working in their communities to make life better for all. They are acting not out of a sense of 
legal duty but out of a sense of human decency.  
    Like our soldiers and sailors in all parts of the world they are meeting freedom's 
challenge on the firing line, and I salute them for their honor and their courage.  
    My fellow Americans, this is a problem which faces us all - in every city of the North as 
well as the South. Today there are Negroes unemployed, two or three times as many compared to 
whites, inadequate in education, moving into the large cities, unable to find work, young people 
particularly out of work without hope, denied equal rights, denied the opportunity to eat at a 
restaurant or lunch counter or go to a movie theater, denied the right to a decent education, 
denied almost today the right to attend a State university even though qualified. It seems to me 
that these are matters which concern us all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or Governors, 
but every citizen of the United States.  
This is one country. It has become one country because all of us and all the people who 
came here had an equal chance to develop their talents.  
We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you can't have that right; that your 
children can't have the chance to develop whatever talents they have; that the only way that they 
are going to get their rights is to go into the streets and demonstrate. I think we owe them and we 
owe ourselves a better country than that.  
    Therefore, I am asking for your help in making it easier for us to move ahead and to 
provide the kind of equality of treatment which we would want ourselves; to give a chance for 
every child to be educated to the limit of his talents.  
    As I have said before, not every child has an equal talent or an equal ability or an equal 
motivation, but they should have the equal right to develop their talent and their ability and their 
motivation, to make something of themselves.  
    We have a right to expect that the Negro community will be responsible, will uphold the 
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law, but they have a right to expect that the law will be fair, that the Constitution will be color 
blind, as Justice Harlan said at the turn of the century.  
   This is what we are talking about and this is a matter which concerns this country and 
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And what about this age? What about Americans we know now, at a time when the 
inadequate phrase ―Civil Rights‖ has come to reflect an urgent nation-wide struggle for equality 
by ten and a half percent of our people whose skin is not white? 
Clearly, and beyond any possible argument, the Constitution and its Amendments have 
set forth the basic particulars of ―Civil Rights.‖ Negroes were freed from slavery under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and granted the right to vote under the Fifteenth. 
 The time is long past when any sensible American could tolerate the denials of free 
voting rights to all races or the existence of ―White Only‖ signs on public facilities—even by the 
narrowest interpretation, these things are unconstitutional. 
 And nine years ago the Supreme Court ruled that the old faulty dictum of ―separate but 
equal‖ schooling for Negroes was unconstitutional too. 
 But we must now wait, as intelligent modern Americans in a changing society; must we 
now wait for the Supreme Court to spell out each new particularity of civil rights to us? 
Whatever color we are, let us hope not. 
 Now as always, when the Constitution is too narrowly interpreted on a word-for-word 
basis, it can too easily become a crutch for reaction, a rationalization, and excuse for maintaining 
the status quo. 
 This is the very thing that Jefferson feared, so long ago, when he urged us not to regard 
the wording of a document with ―sanctimonious reverence.‖ 
 My point is that the Constitution was never meant to specify every detail, every 
individual right in the relations of man to man in this country. 
 It was intended to set forth certain duties of government and certain restrictions on 
government—nowhere in its wording does it pretend to tell us, as individual citizens, how to 
treat our neighbors. 
 But what Woodrow Wilson called the spirit of the Constitution does, and has always 
done just that. Interspersed throughout the Constitution and its amendments—written in between 
the lines, if you will—are the basic moral principles of democratic justice by which we all try to 
live. 
 Surely we don‘t need a new Court decision to tell us that Negro is entitled to decent 
housing, and that his right to have such housing must not be denied or abridged because of his 
color. 
 Surely we don‘t need a new Court ruling to insure the Negro equal opportunities in 
employment, or equal opportunities to advance from unskilled into skilled and responsible jobs. 
 These are moral issues, not legal ones, and their constitutionality is a matter of common 
sense. 
 Not in its words alone but in what these words imply, in the underlying truths it 
teaches—that is how the Constitution has always served us as an inspiration and a guide. 
 And today that is how it points the way clearly to what thinking Americans have known 
all along: that racial discrimination is not worthy of us; that he stifling air of prejudice is not fit 
to be breathed by the people of a nation that takes pride in calling itself fee. 
 The shameful scenes of riot and bloodshed in Oxford, Mississippi, last Fall, and in 
Birmingham, Alabama this Spring, were only symptoms of the trouble—outward manifestations 
of an inner disease. And the infection is by no means localized. 
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 Let no white northerner delude himself that discrimination is chiefly a matter of southern 
concern. It may be true that a northern Negro is free to register at a Hilton hotel, but how much 
pride or pleasure can he take in this when he can‘t buy three meals a day for his children? 
 In Detroit, where Negroes account for twenty percent of the population, they account for 
sixty percent of the unemployed. In Chicago, one out of every four Negroes with families to 
support is out of work. And the same frustrating, demoralizing facts are to be found in the Negro 
ghettos of every other northern city. 
 This is a national crisis, and it is immediate. The federal government is doing and will 
continue to do its part. Indeed, in the past two and a half years more progress has been made in 
securing equal rights for all Americans—through executive action, legislation, litigation, 
persuasion and private initiative—than in any comparable period of our history. Yet a great deal 
more needs to be done. 
 But in questions of public morality, Federal action alone is not enough. In an era of great 
social flux and upheaval, it would be idle for anyone to suppose that real enlightenment can be 
brought about by governmental edict. 
 The surface eruptions of an internal disease cannot be cured with bandages. The only way 
to cure a disease is to attack it at the source; and the sources of this disease, this malignancy that 
has been allowed to grow within the tissue of our national life, are as minute and various as the 
cells in any living body. 
 They are to be found throughout the texture of our society, wherever a meeting takes 
place between persons of light and dark skin. 
 That is where the treatment must begin. There must be active and continued work toward 
interracial understanding at all levels—in states, in cities, in individual neighborhoods within 
cities, in towns and hamlets and in homes across the length and breadth of this nation. 
 Leadership must be taken at every level—by clergymen, by educators, by civil 
authorities, by newspapers, by businessmen and by labor unions. But above all, I believe that the 
moral health of this country depends on individual citizens, white and Negro, who are able to use 
their minds, able to see, able to act truthfully in a time of evolutionary change. 
 For too many years the Negro have been asked to ―be patient,‖ and advised that we must 
all ―move slowly in adjusting civil rights to social custom.‖ 
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The Civil Rights Movement 1910-1968 
 
 
1910   - Founding of NAACP (National Association for the  
   Advancement of Colored People) 
 
1917   - John Fitzgerald Kennedy is born. 
 
1917-1935  - Harlem Renaissance 
 
1923   - Moore vs. Dempsey 
 
1925   - Robert Francis Kennedy is born. 
 
1929   - Martin Luther King, Jr. is born. 
 
1931   - The Scottsboro Case 
 
1942   - Founding of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)  
 
1944   - Smith vs. Allright 
 
1946   - Morgan vs. Virginia 
 
1947   -―Journey of Reconciliation‖, predecessor to the 1961  
   CORE Freedom Rides  
   - Jackie Robinson plays for the Brooklyn Dodgers, breaking the  
color barrier in Major League Baseball. 
 
1951   - NAACP activist Harry T. Moore is assassinated. 
 
1952   - John F. Kennedy wins election to the Senate. 
 
1954   - Brown v. Board of Education. 
    
1955   - (August) Emmet Till is brutally murdered in Mississippi. 
   - (December) Montgomery bus boycott led by Rev. Dr. Martin  
Luther King, Jr. 
 
1957   - Eisenhower sends troops to Little Rock, Arkansas. 
   - King helps establish SCLC (Southern Christian  
   Leadership Conference) 
 
1960   - (February) Greensboro, North Carolina Sit-Ins begin 
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   - (April) Founding of SNCC (Student Non-Violent  
   Coordinating Committee) 
   - (October) John F. Kennedy phone call to Coretta Scott King. 
   - (November) John F. Kennedy is elected president. 
 
1961   - (May) CORE Freedom Rides begin in the South. 
 
1962   - (October) Centennial Anniversary of the Emancipation  
Proclamation. 
- (October) John F. Kennedy sends troops to University of  
Mississippi to enforce integration. 
 
1963   - (Spring) Birmingham Marches led by King and Fred  
   Shuttlesworth. 
   - (May 24) Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall meet with the 
Baldwin group in New York City. 
   - (June 11) Integration of the University of Alabama.   
   - (June 11) John F. Kennedy makes ―Moral Crisis‖ speech to the  
   American public, committing the federal government to the  
creation of comprehensive civil rights legislation. 
   - (August 28) March on Washington. 
   - (September) Birmingham Church Bombing. 
   - (November) John F. Kennedy assassinated in Dallas, Texas. 
   - (November) Lyndon B. Johnson sworn in as president. 
 
1964   - (July) Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
1965   - (March) Selma: voting rights march to Montgomery. 
   - Voting Rights Act of 1965.       
   - (August) Riots in Watts, California. 
   - Malcolm X assassinated in New York City.  
   - (Summer) Riots in Chicago and Cleveland 
   - Stokely Carmichael becomes head of SNCC and creates  
   a separatist philosophy of black power, ousts whites from  
   the organization. 
   - Black Panther party founded. 
- (Summer) Riots in Detroit, Michigan. U.S. military is  
   brought in to quell the violence, utilizing tanks and the  




1968   - (April) Martin Luther King, Jr. assassinated in Memphis,  
Tennessee.  

















































―Kennedy and Baldwin: The Gulf‖ 
 
There was so much James Baldwin wanted to tell Robert F. Kennedy. He wanted to talk 
about the Negro kid in San Francisco who told him bitterly, ―I‘ve got no country, I‘ve got no 
flag.‖ About the ―cat in the Harlem barber shop‖ who listens to Black Muslim Malcolm X rather 
than the moderate Martin Luther King, Jr. because the extremist ―articulates the pain and despair 
best.‖ About the jobless Negro in Detroit, the Negro children living in ―a kind of tinderbox‖ in 
Chicago, the Negro anywhere who ―feels he is a burden, inferior, wont listen any longer, no 
longer believes a word you say…‖ 
Perhaps there was just too much to tell. Baldwin, the sad-eyed Negro essayist, novelist, 
and angry young man, got his chance to deliver the message at two remarkable meetings with the 
Attorney General last week. But the confrontation was, by one participant‘s account, ―a gigantic 
flop.‖ 
Kennedy himself had initiated the talks. As the Administration‘s No. 1 civil-rights 
enforcer, he was worried about rising racial tensions, North and South. Hungry for new ideas, he 
invited Baldwin down to his Hickory Hill estate at McLean, Va., for a preliminary breakfast. 
―Look, Jim,‖ he said, ―get some of your best people together in New York and I‘ll come up and 
we‘ll talk this whole thing over.‖ 
Pleased, Baldwin rounded up a mixed dozen, short on civil-rights organization men and 
long on the lively arts (Harry Belafonte, Lena Horne, playwright Lorraine Hansberry, white actor 
Rip Torn, and Baldwin‘s brother David, an actor). His aim: ―As wide and even as rowdy a range 
of opinion as possible.‖ Kennedy and his civil-rights chief, Burke Marshall slipped into town, 
and the group sat down in Joseph Kennedy‘s Central Park South apartment for two and a half 
hours of informal talk. 
But, as the Negroes saw it, they never bridged what Baldwin called the ―gulf‖ between 
them—between Harlem and McLean. For one thing, the Negroes wanted to talk about race 
troubles in the North, about the rising tensions over de facto segregation in the black ghettos. But 
Kennedy, so they said, steered the talk south to Birmingham, Mississippi, ―the same old 
stuff.‖…Voices and tempers flared… 
That was precisely the message the Negroes wanted to get across—a message of anger, 
of quickening urgency, of deepening alienation. Baldwin said, ―No one can afford to regard this 
as a failure…We‘ve finally opened up a dialogue. No one can expect that dialogue to be polite, 
but we‘ve started.‖ But plainly he had found the gulf too wide. ―He just didn‘t get the point,‖ 
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